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ARTICLES
RECOGNIZING THE RIGHT TO PETITION FOR
VICTIMS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
Tamara L. Kuennen*
Like any citizen, a victim of domestic violence (DV) may call the police
for help when she needs it. And yet, when a victim calls the police, she not
only seeks law enforcement assistance but also invokes her constitutional
right to seek one of the most fundamental services the government can
provide—protection from harm. That right, recently described by the
Supreme Court as “essential to freedom,” is the right “to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances” guaranteed by the First
Amendment.
This Article argues that a combination of law and policy initiatives
produces negative collateral consequences for DV victims that flow directly
from calling the police, thereby creating an impediment to the right of
victims to petition. The vast majority of DV victims do not report the
violence to the police. Feminist legal scholars and policymakers widely
acknowledge that this underreporting is a major roadblock to the justice
system’s ability to effectively address DV.
The underreporting problem is most severe with battered mothers. In
many jurisdictions across the country, police report battered mothers to
Child Protective Services (CPS) as a matter of course, without any
investigation of actual risk to the child. The practice serves a wellintentioned goal: by referring all DV cases to CPS, the police bring to the
attention of the state at-risk children who might otherwise fall under the
radar. However, given the notorious treatment of DV victims and their
children by CPS, a significant number of victims choose not to call the
police at all, for fear of having their children taken away.
In addition to the chilling effect on victims’ calls for help, a sweeping
practice of reporting all DV calls to CPS inundates the agency with reports
it must, by law, investigate. In the last decade, 60 percent of the reports
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Arthur Best, Deborah Cantrell, Alan Chen, Margaret Drew, Deborah Epstein, Eric Franklin,
Brittany Glidden, Phyllis Goldfarb, Leigh Goodmark, Nancy Leong, Kevin Lynch, Binny
Miller, Helen Norton, Jane Stovall, and Lindsey Webb for their thoughtful comments, and to
Hannah Misner, Rachel Kranz, Drew Quisenberry, and Katie Stevenson for their invaluable
research.
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made each year were unsubstantiated. While an across-the-board, “reportall” policy may be motivated by a praiseworthy goal, a reporting practice
that produces fewer, but more accurate, referrals to CPS would provide
greater protection to children. The Petition Clause requires as much.
This Article lays out the claim that these systemic barriers to reporting
DV create such a significant impediment to calling the police that they
violate the right to petition. It first defines the right to petition, reviews its
history and purpose, and demonstrates that it has been overshadowed by,
and confused with, the right to speech. Building on the growing body of
scholarly literature suggesting that this should not be so, the Article shows
that, while the rights of speech and petition overlap, they are not
coextensive. Judicial analysis of the right to petition should not be identical
to that of speech. Rather, in evaluating petition claims by DV victims, the
courts should apply strict scrutiny analysis: only by proving a compelling
state interest and the use of the least restrictive means for achieving that
interest should government policies that infringe upon a victim’s right to
call the police survive. Furthermore, even under a less-than-strict level of
scrutiny, the report-all practice should be unconstitutional. The Article
concludes by identifying other government practices that deter victims’
reports that might implicate the Petition Clause. It then discusses the
broader, political implications of viewing a call to the police as an
invocation of a constitutional right to petition and makes the case that the
right to petition has as of yet untapped potential for feminist legal scholars
and policymakers addressing DV.
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INTRODUCTION
Like any citizen, a victim of domestic violence (DV) may call the police
for help when she needs it. And yet, when a victim calls the police she not
only seeks law enforcement assistance, but also invokes her constitutional
right to seek one of the most fundamental services the government can
provide—protection from harm. That right, recently described by the
Supreme Court as “essential to freedom,”1 is the right “to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances” guaranteed by the First
Amendment.2
The vast majority of DV victims do not report the violence to the police.3
As I have written elsewhere, many victims are reluctant to report for myriad
personal and relational reasons.4 These reasons do not implicate the
Petition Clause. But when the government—via law, policy, or practice—
deters victims from reporting, the government’s actions raise constitutional
concerns. This Article argues that a combination of law and policy
initiatives produces negative collateral consequences on DV victims that
flow directly from calling the police, thereby creating an impediment to the
right of victims to petition.
The Article focuses on a specific police practice to explore in depth how
a victim’s right to petition is unconstitutionally burdened. In numerous
jurisdictions across the country, when police respond to the scene of DV,
1. Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 131 S. Ct. 2488, 2491 (2011).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. I. This Article refers to this clause as the Petition Clause.
3. See KERRY MURPHY HEALEY & CHRISTINE SMITH, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BATTERER
PROGRAMS: WHAT CRIMINAL JUSTICE AGENCIES NEED TO KNOW 2 (1998), available at
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/171683.pdf (“[A]s many as six in seven domestic assaults go
unreported.”); PATRICIA TJADEN & NANCY THOENNES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EXTENT,
NATURE, AND CONSEQUENCES OF INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE: FINDINGS FROM THE
NATIONAL VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN SURVEY 49–50 (2000), available at
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/181867.pdf (finding that 17.2 percent of women raped by
an intimate partner reported the most recent incident to the police and 26.7 percent of women
physically assaulted by an intimate partner reported the most recent incident to the police).
4. See Tamara L. Kuennen, Private Relationships and Public Problems: Applying
Principles of Relational Contract Theory to Domestic Violence, 2010 BYU L. REV. 515,
531–32 (reporting that many victims wish to preserve, rather than sever, their relationships
for a variety of personal reasons well-documented in the scholarly literature, including love
for the partner, dependence on him for economic security, and fear of losing custody of
children, to name but a few, and arguing that because the justice system views separation as
the only solution to DV, women who are not willing or able to separate choose not to report
or otherwise seek the assistance of the state to redress the violence).
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they reflexively report the presence of a child to Child Protective Services
(CPS); this report is made as a matter of course, without an investigation of
the actual risk to the child.5 In some instances, police make reports to CPS
even if the children are not present in the home, and even if the perpetrator
does not live in the home.6
5. See Telephone Interview with Gerard Asselin, Sergeant, Anchorage Police Dep’t
(Nov. 29, 2010) (notes on file with author for all calls cited herein) (“Our policy is, if parties
involved in a DV call have children, whether or not children are directly involved, the
officers must make notification to OCS—to clarify, either party involved can have a child—
they need not necessarily have children together. Basically, if either party involved in a DV
call has a child, OCS must be notified.”); Email from Becky Buttram, Detective,
Indianapolis Metro. Police Dep’t (Dec. 14, 2010) (on file with author) (“I know personally,
that in the time that MCSD had a DV unit, all DV cases were referred to Child Protective
Services for follow up that involved children present.”); Telephone Interview with Don
Ciardella, Inspector, S.F. Police Dep’t (Dec. 29, 2010) (“More often than not, officers will
report if the child was present at the incident . . . .”); Telephone Interview with Carol
Horowtiz, Santa Fe Police Dep’t (Jan. 5, 2011) (“By protocol, officers are always supposed
to notify our Child Youth and Family Department if there is a child at the scene of domestic
violence.”); Telephone Interview with Tina Jones, Sergeant, Domestic Violence Unit,
Portland, Or. Police Dep’t (Dec. 29, 2010) (“I can tell you that all of our domestic violence
reports where children are listed are cross-reported to human services.”); Telephone
Interview with Mike Kellog, Detective, Denver Police Dep’t (Dec. 22, 2010) (“If there is a
child present, Human Services will definitely know about it because officers have to note it
on the report. . . . [T]he number one goal is safety for the kids, and Human Services will
probably find out about it and decide what to do.”); Email from Coleen Kohtz, Dep’t of
Family & Children’s Servs. Law Enforcement Liaison, San Jose Police Dep’t Family
Violence Unit (Feb. 11, 2010) (on file with author) (“Currently SJPD cross reports all
Domestic Violence where children are present to Santa Clara County DFCS.”); Telephone
Interview with Amy Lutz, Officer, Research & Planning Unit, Phila. Police Dep’t (Apr. 20,
2010) (“When we get a call to the scene and are told children are there we refer to DHS.”);
Email from Michelle L. Robinson, Lieutenant, D.C. Metro. Police Dep’t (Dec. 8, 2010) (on
file with author) (“I recently received information that the department is currently working
with our Child and Family Services Agency in drafting directives that require officers to
make notification to CFSA.”); Telephone Interview with Ashley Spinney, Victims’
Assistance Intern, Detroit Police Dep’t (Dec. 15, 2010) (“If there was a child involved in any
way we see if it was already reported by looking at that file number, and if not, we will
report it ourselves. . . . If an officer didn’t see the child himself, but knew the parties have a
child in common, they would note that. . . . This is the same if only one of the parties has a
child, whether the child was present or not.”); Telephone Interview with Sylvia Vella,
Detective, San Diego Police Dep’t (Dec. 7, 2010) (“These situations are cross-reported with
CPS—if we get a call, say you and your husband are fighting and you have a four year old,
that report will get cross-reported with CPS. . . . There is mandatory reporting to CPS even
if only one party to the incident had a child, and that child was not in the home. Because
statistically, the danger to a child that is not the perpetrator’s goes up—so if there is an
incident in the home and say the child was staying with his biological dad that night—it will
be reported to CPS and added that the child was not there—but CPS will interview the kid to
see if maybe the child was present at other incidents when the police were not called—so
CPS will investigate and build a case. We’re actually seeing now in San Diego, where CPS
is demanding that the victim, male or female, seek a restraining order to keep perpetrator out
of home or else CPS will take the kids.”); See also Minneapolis Police Dep’t, MPD Policy &
Procedure Manual, MinneapolisMN.com, § 7-314 (Mar. 14, 2012), http://www.minneapolis
mn.gov/police/policy/mpdpolicy_7-300_7-300 (“In all cases of domestic violence or alleged
acts of domestic abuse, a CAPRS report and supplement shall be completed immediately.”).
6. In addition to the comments of Detective Sylvia Vella of the San Diego Police
Department and Victims’ Assistance Intern Ashley Spinney of the Detroit Police
Department, supra note 5, perhaps the most widely publicized example of this police
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Given the notorious treatment of DV victims and their children by CPS, a
significant number of victims choose not to call the police for help, for fear
of having their children taken away. As one woman stated:
It does more damage to call the police . . . . The call to the police opened
up so many doors. Then I had three different services watching me and
with the kids. Child protective put me at risk for losing my children; they
said, next time they’ll take the kids! I always thought the police were
there to help me. I would never call them again.7

I argue that the sweeping practice of reporting all DV calls to CPS, rather
than a more discerning policy that would require assessment of actual risk
to a child, violates the victim’s First Amendment right to petition because it
substantially deters victims from contacting the police at all. The petition
right guarantees citizens access to their government; as such, it is
fundamental to self-governance and democracy. In the context of DV, it is
fundamental to life itself.
After defining the right to petition and reviewing its history and purpose,
I explain in Part I why the right is the “unknown soldier” of the First
Amendment,8 focusing particularly on how it has been overshadowed by
and frequently confused with the right of free speech. Building on the
growing body of scholarly literature suggesting that this should not be so, I
argue that while the rights of speech and petition overlap, they are not
coextensive.
In Part II, I argue that for this reason the right to petition, a separately
enumerated right in the text of the First Amendment with a distinct history
and purpose, deserves a distinct judicial analysis. And that the level of
judicial scrutiny applied to the right should be strict: only by proving a
compelling state interest and the least restrictive method for achieving that
interest should the government be permitted to infringe upon a citizen’s
right to petition. Applying this analysis to the police’s “report-all” policy, I
conclude that the policy clearly violates the Petition Clause. I also conclude
that even if the Supreme Court were to misapply a more deferential lessthan-strict scrutiny analysis using a more open-ended balancing test, a
sweeping “report-all” policy is unconstitutional.
Finally, in Part III, I discuss the broader implications of viewing a
victim’s call to the police as an invocation of a constitutional and political
right, deserving of the same respect as other First Amendment rights.
Implicitly, the federal Violence Against Women Act9 (VAWA) has
practice occurred in the case of Shawrline Nicholson, named plaintiff in the class action on
behalf of battered mothers in New York City. See Nicholson v. Williams, 203 F. Supp. 2d
153 (E.D.N.Y. 2002); infra Part II.B. One of Shawrline’s two children was not at home
when the father of her child assaulted her; nonetheless, the police reported to the local CPS
office, who immediately removed the child from her care. Id. at 169–70.
7. Donna Coker, Crime Control and Feminist Law Reform in Domestic Violence Law:
A Critical Review, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 801, 834 & n.128 (2001).
8. See infra note 12 and accompanying text.
9. Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1902 (1994) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of the U.S. Code). VAWA has been reauthorized twice, most recently in 2005. See
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addressed burdens on victims’ right to petition in the contexts of housing
and immigration laws. The Act amended federal housing law that once
allowed landlords to evict victims of DV who called the police for help;
similarly, it amended immigration laws that deterred undocumented
immigrant victims from calling the police for fear of being deported.10 This
section argues that numerous other government practices that deter victims
from accessing the government fall within the ambit of the Petition Clause.
Indeed, the Petition Clause has the untapped potential to protect against
even the day-to-day, hostile treatment of victims by police, court clerks, and
other state actors—a remarkably powerful deterrent to reporting, but one
that has proven difficult to prevent or redress.
While viewing a DV victim’s request for assistance from the government
as invoking a constitutional and political right has the potential to command
the same respect and deference as that of other First Amendment rights, the
Article concludes with a cautionary note. Bolstering a DV victim’s right to
access the justice system, and particularly to call the police, could have the
unintended consequence of diminishing her ability to privately order her
intimate relationships and life. Victims of DV should not be forced to call
the police; rather, victims of DV should be able to petition the government
for redress, if they so choose, in the same way that victims of strangerviolence may do and in the same way that any ordinary citizen may do.
I. THE RIGHT TO PETITION
The First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution reads: “Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the
right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government
for a redress of grievances.”11
Despite the fact that the right to petition is, on the face of the First
Amendment, a separately enumerated right, it has been described as the
“unknown soldier” of the First Amendment guarantees.12 This is largely
attributable to the Supreme Court’s blurring of the right to petition with the
right to free speech in its First Amendment jurisprudence.13

Violence Against Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L.
No. 109-162, 119 Stat. 2960 (2006).
10. See infra Part III.
11. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
12. See GEORGE W. PRING & PENELOPE CANAN, SLAPPS GETTING SUED FOR SPEAKING
OUT 16, 18 (1996) (describing the right to petition as the “‘unknown soldier’ of the Bill of
Rights” and positing that it is “seldom thought of or relied on by the politically active . . .
perhaps because ‘the right to petition appears so much a part of everyman’s constitutional
instinct that he is hardly aware of its existence at the time he is most involved in an exercise
of the right’” (quoting D. Smith, The Right to Petition for Redress of Grievances:
Constitutional Development and Interpretations 151 (1971) (unpublished dissertation, Texas
Tech University))).
13. See infra Part I.D.
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In this section I define the right and explain its significance in the context
of DV. I then make the case that while the rights of petition and speech
overlap, they are not coextensive, as the history and purpose of the Petition
Clause illustrate. The Supreme Court has not clearly articulated what level
of judicial scrutiny applies to government infringements on an individual’s
right to petition. Indeed, as illustrated by its most recent Petition Clause
decision, the Court sometimes treats the right identically to the right to
speech, while other times it does not. I argue that as a distinct, explicitly
enumerated right, the right to petition deserves separate judicial analysis.
A. The Right to Petition in the Context of DV
The Petition Clause provides citizens14 with the fundamental right to ask
the government to redress wrongs.15 “Petitioning is the act of presenting a
communication” to any branch of government to seek redress of a
grievance16—which could either be a dispute between individuals or a
dispute with the government17—and encompasses any attempt of an
individual to seek the government’s assistance or action.18 Lobbying the
legislature for a change in law and writing a letter to the governor to request
relief are clear examples of petitioning activity.19 So too is reporting a
crime to the police.20
14. Noncitizens also arguably hold this right. See Michael J. Wishnie, Immigrants and
the Right to Petition, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 667 (2003).
15. See Carol Rice Andrews, After BE & K: The “Difficult Constitutional Question” of
Defining the First Amendment Right to Petition Courts, 39 HOUS. L. REV. 1299 (2003)
[hereinafter Andrews, After BE & K]; Carol Rice Andrews, A Right of Access to Court
Under the Petition Clause of the First Amendment: Defining the Right, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 557
(1999) [hereinafter Andrews, A Right of Access]; Stephen A. Higginson, A Short History of
the Right to Petition Government for the Redress of Grievances, 96 YALE L.J. 142 (1986);
Gregory A. Mark, The Vestigial Constitution: The History and Significance of the Right to
Petition, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 2153 (1998); Wishnie, supra note 14.
16. Wishnie, supra note 14, at 668.
17. See Julie M. Spanbauer, The First Amendment Right to Petition Government for a
Redress of Grievances: Cut From a Different Cloth, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 15, 28 (1993)
(describing the history of petitioning and its particular inclusion of private disputes between
individual parties as grievances for which redress could be sought).
18. See PRING & CANAN, supra note 12, at 16 (“Today, [the right] covers any peaceful,
legal attempt to promote or discourage government action at any level (federal, state, or
local) and in any branch (legislative, executive, judicial, and the electorate).”).
19. See, e.g., McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479, 484 (1985) (holding a letter to a
governor is a petition); E. R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S.
127, 138 (1961) (holding legislative lobbying falls squarely within petitioning activity).
20. See, e.g., Meyer v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 482 F.3d 1232, 1243 (10th Cir. 2007)
(concluding that filing a criminal complaint is an exercise of the First Amendment right to
petition); Gable v. Lewis, 201 F.3d 769, 771 (6th Cir. 2000) (“[S]ubmission of complaints
and criticisms to nonlegislative and nonjudicial public agencies like a police department
constitutes petitioning activity protected by the petition clause”); Seamons v. Snow, 84 F.3d
1226, 1238 (10th Cir. 1996) (stating that denying the ability to report physical assaults is an
infringement of protected speech); Estate of Morris v. Dapolito, 297 F. Supp. 2d 680, 692
(S.D.N.Y. 2004) (concluding that swearing out a criminal complaint against a high school
teacher for assault and seeking his arrest were protected First Amendment petitioning
activities); Lott v. Andrews Ctr., 259 F. Supp. 2d 564, 568 (E.D. Tex. 2003) (“There is no
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When a victim of DV calls the police for help, she invokes her right to
petition the government for one of the most fundamental services it can
provide: protection from bodily harm. Two scholars have examined a DV
victim’s call to the police as a petition to the government for redress.21
Both focused on the specific context of housing laws and policies that
infringe the right. Lenora Lapidus documented the phenomenon of
landlords and housing authorities evicting victims of DV for calling the
police to their homes.22 She argued: “If a battered woman is evicted after
the housing authority learns of the abuse as a result of police activity . . .
she is essentially being punished for exercising her right to petition . . . .”23
The result is that battered women are more likely to hide rather than report
abuse,24 jeopardizing the “gains made over the last three decades in creating
opportunities for women to obtain governmental protection through arrest
laws.”25 Cari Fais extended Lapidus’s argument to nuisance abatement
ordinances that similarly require landlords to evict tenants who repeatedly
call the police to their homes.26
Both scholars concluded that a Petition Clause claim would be novel, and
worthy of exploration in the context of DV. While Lapidus and Fais
advanced a creative idea, they did not analyze the right, and more
importantly, they did not theorize what level of judicial scrutiny should
apply.27 This Article seeks to fill that gap, building upon a more
generalized body of First Amendment right of petition scholarship.
doubt that filing a legitimate criminal complaint with law enforcement officials constitutes
an exercise of the First Amendment right”); United States v. Hylton, 558 F. Supp. 872, 874
(S.D. Tex. 1982) (“[T]he filing of a legitimate criminal complaint with local law
enforcement officials constitutes an exercise of the [F]irst [A]mendment right.”); Curry v.
Florida, 811 So. 2d 736, 743 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002) (finding that complaints, even though
numerous, made to law enforcement agencies are protected First Amendment activity
regardless of the “unsavory motivation” of petitioner); Arim v. Gen. Motors Corp., 520
N.W.2d 695 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994) (per curiam) (granting summary judgment to individuals
who were sued for their participation in a criminal sting operation run based on the First
Amendment).
21. See Lenora M. Lapidus, Doubly Victimized: Housing Discrimination Against
Victims of Domestic Violence, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 377 (2003); Cari Fais,
Note, Denying Access to Justice: The Cost of Applying Chronic Nuisance Laws to Domestic
Violence, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1181 (2008).
22. See Lapidus, supra note 21, at 384 (arguing that discrimination is not limited to
eviction, but occurs “in a variety of other ways and at various stages of the housing process,”
including the application process, the terms and conditions of tenancy, and transfer from one
public housing complex to another).
23. Id. at 383 (“In turn, other battered women may be wary of seeking assistance from
law enforcement and the legal system for fear of similar reprisal, thus effecting a chill of the
exercise of their First Amendment rights.”).
24. Id. at 378.
25. Id. at 384.
26. See Fais, supra note 21.
27. I note, however, that Lapidus implies that some tier of intermediate scrutiny applies,
for she characterized the housing authority’s interest as a “substantial interest” and argued
that the government practice at issue “restricts more petitioning activity than necessary to
achieve the government’s objectives.” Lapidus, supra note 21, at 384. These terms, in
accordance with modern right-to-speech doctrine, are synonymous with some tier of
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B. Text and History of the Right to Petition
The Petition Clause has been characterized as oft-forgotten,28 a
constitutional footnote,29 and the poor stepchild of the First Amendment.30
Yet over the years a number of scholars have extensively traced its
history,31 and recently there is movement afoot to revive it.32 These
scholars argue that the text, history, and purpose of the Petition Clause
illustrate the distinct and separate status that the right to petition deserves,
but has not been given.33
The text of the First Amendment is unambiguous: it sets forth a right, in
a separate clause, which extends beyond the right of free speech. It
promises “that a particular audience—‘the government’—is forever open to
hear a specialized kind of expression—‘a petition . . . for a redress of
grievances.’”34 Though the right of free speech has taken center stage in
First Amendment jurisprudence, scholars argue that there is no reason that
this should be so: “Just as each and every part of the Fifth Amendment and
the Fourteenth Amendment enjoys individualized exegeses, independent

intermediate scrutiny. Lapidus likely means something akin to what is applied to contentneutral regulations of speech. In short, Lapidus assumes that something-less-than-strict
judicial scrutiny applies. See id. at 384. Fais, on the other hand, argued that the term
“abridge” in the Petition Clause “is ‘to reduce in scope’ or ‘diminish,’” and thus any
diminishment of a victim’s ability to report her victimization to the police is
unconstitutional. See Fais, supra note 21, at 1222 (“Those defending against a right to
petition theory might say that the burden is slight compared with the governmental
objectives of conserving resources to make sure that police service are available to all people
in need . . . . However, the plain meaning of the word abridge is ‘to reduce in scope’ . . . .”).
28. See Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr. & Clint A. Carpenter, The Return of Seditious Libel,
55 UCLA L. REV. 1239, 1239 (2008).
29. See id. at 1304.
30. See Ashutosh Bhagwat, Associational Speech, 120 YALE L.J. 978, 980 (2011).
31. For detailed histories, see generally RONALD J. KROTOSZYNSKI, JR., RECLAIMING THE
PETITION CLAUSE (2012); Andrews, A Right of Access, supra note 15; Higginson, supra note
15; Mark, supra note 15; Spanbauer, supra note 17.
32. See KROTOSZYNSKI, supra note 31 (application of the right to alternative dispute
resolution); Krotoszynski & Carpenter, supra note 28 (arguing for Petition Clause
application to political protests); James E. Pfander, Sovereign Immunity and the Right to
Petition: Toward a First Amendment Right to Pursue Judicial Claims Against the
Government, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 899 (1997); Spanbauer, supra note 17 (arguing that the
Supreme Court has not given the Petition Clause the distinct status it deserves among other
First Amendment guarantees); Wishnie, supra note 14 (arguing for its application to
undocumented immigrants’ reports to law enforcement); Anita Hodgkiss, Note, Petitioning
and the Empowerment Theory of Practice, 96 YALE L.J. 569 (1987) (suggesting that lawyers
might use the right to petition to empower disadvantaged clients); see also Bhagwat, supra
note 30, at 981 (“[E]ven today, assembly, petition, and association are at least as central to
the process of self-governance as is free speech.”); Adam Eckstein, The Petition Clause and
Alternative Dispute Resolution: Constitutional and Consistency Arguments for Providing
Noerr-Penington Immunity to ADR, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 1683, 1703 (2007) (arguing for the
application of the right to alternative dispute resolution).
33. See, e.g., Bhagwat, supra note 30, at 980 (“[F]ree speech has been the central focus
of First Amendment law and scholarship. In fact, however, the text of the First Amendment
is not limited to, or even particularly focused on, speech.”).
34. Wishnie, supra note 14, at 725–26 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. I).
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clauses of the First Amendment, including the Petition Clause, should
command the same respect.”35
The decision of the drafters to memorialize the right in a separate clause
reflected an appreciation of its unique role. So too does its history. In a
growing body of literature, discussed briefly below, Petition Clause
scholars persuasively argue: (1) the right to petition predates and (some
suggest) gave rise to the right to speech; (2) the Framers intended for the
right to be given special status; (3) the right was central to American
politics and self-governance both before and after the ratification of the Bill
of Rights; and (4) the right encompassed both individual, private grievances
and those that were of community-wide concern.
The right to petition is ancient.36 It dates back to the tenth century in
England,37 though scholars agree that it did not take significance until
Magna Carta in 1215. “Later, the Petition of Right of 1628 drew upon
centuries of tradition and Magna Carta as a model for the Parliament to
issue a plea, or even a demand, that the Crown refrain from certain
actions.”38 The right was made almost absolute for all British subjects
when it was codified in the English Bill of Rights of 1689.39 Because the
right of speech did not fully emerge until the late eighteenth or early
nineteenth centuries, some scholars have argued that the right to speech was
a progeny to the right to petition,40 and that petitioning is more fundamental
than speech to a politically functional society.41
By the time of the American Revolution, petitioning was extremely
popular and widespread in England. It was not checked or penalized, as

35. Krotoszynski & Carpenter, supra note 28, at 1246. It should be noted, however, that
some scholars have suggested that the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment was effectively “rob[bed] . . . of all meaning” in the Slaughter-House Cases, 83
U.S. 36 (1873). See ERWIN CHEMERINSKEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES
494–97. See generally Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment,
101 YALE L.J. 1193 (1992).
36. See Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 131 S. Ct. 2488, 2499 (2011); PRING &
CANAAN, supra note 12, at 15 (tracing the roots of the right to petition to “earl[y] English
law[] of more than 1,000 years ago” and giving “birth to the Magna Carta”); Andrews, A
Right of Access, supra note 15, at 596–603 (describing early English petitioning from the
Magna Carta to the mid-eighteenth century); Norman B. Smith, “Shall Make No Law
Abridging . . .”: An Analysis of the Neglected, but Nearly Absolute, Right of Petition, 54 U.
CIN. L. REV. 1153, 1154 (1986).
37. See Krotoszynski & Carpenter, supra note 28, at 1299.
38. Guarnieri, 131 S. Ct. at 2499. From the Magna Carta to the English Bill of Rights
of 1689, several English documents recognized the right to petition the King and Parliament
for both public and private grievances. See Wishnie, supra note 14, at 685 n.93 (citing Mark,
supra note 15, at 2165–66; Smith, supra note 36, at 1156).
39. See Krotoszynski & Carpenter, supra note 28, at 1298.
40. See id. at 1299.
41. See Bhagwat, supra note 30, at 981, 994 (arguing that the right to petition was
antecedent to, and as central as, speech in the process of self-government, and observing that
petitioning is an older form of political participation, surviving from a pre-democratic era).
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was the right of speech,42 and was frequently successful in achieving
results.43 Several colonial governments explicitly recognized petitioning as
a right, and all of the colonies implicitly recognized petitioning as a primary
means by which individuals participated in government.44 Colonists,
including colonial assemblies, not only secured the right to petition for
themselves in colonial government, but frequently petitioned the British
government, and were increasingly frustrated in the years before the
Revolution by the Crown’s failure to respond.45 Indeed, this was a major
source of outcry in the Declaration of Independence.46 In short, the
“Framing generation was fully aware of the importance of . . . petitioning in
a system of democratic government, as opposed to the system from which
the Framers had broken.”47
Thus an explicit declaration of the right to petition, amongst other rights
of the people against their government
was in the forefront of the national conscience as the first Congress took
up the task of building a nation. Responding to this widely felt desire,
James Madison proposed amendments to the Constitution that would
eventually become the Bill of Rights—including the right to petition—to
the House of Representatives on June 8, 1789. The right to petition, as
framed in Madison’s proposal, was in a clause separate from the freedoms
of speech and press, and stated that “[t]he people shall not be restrained
. . . from applying to the Legislature by petitions, or remonstrances, for
redress of their grievances.”48

The right was exercised on a mass scale, in both colonial times and in the
first years of the nation. It encompassed both private, individualized
grievances, and matters of community-wide concern. The primary
responsibility of colonial assemblies was settlement of private disputes
raised by petitions.49 The First Congress never once refused to accept a
42. See Spanbauer, supra note 17, at 19–20 (describing how in both England and the
American colonies, it was in the beginning of the eighteenth century that petitioners were, as
a practice, not punished for the content of their petitions).
43. See Wishnie, supra note 14, at 685 n.94 (citing Smith, supra note 36, at 1166; Mark,
supra note 15, at 2163).
44. See Spanbauer, supra note 17, at 28 (“By the time of the American Revolution,
Delaware, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and Vermont . . . provided
explicit protection for the right of colonists to petition local governing bodies for redress of
both individual and collective grievances. Thus, the early colonial governments recognized
petitioning as a tangible right. All colonies, including those which did not provide explicit
protection for petitioning activity, recognized petitioning as a method by which individuals
participated in government and voiced their views to the local governing bodies.”); Wishnie,
supra note 14, at 693 n.146.
45. See Spanbauer, supra note 17, at 32–33.
46. See Krotoszynski & Carpenter, supra note 28, at 1302.
47. Bhagwat, supra note 30, at 991–92 (arguing further that the Framers “understood
that the rights of speech, press, assembly, association, and petition are all at heart political
freedoms that are essential to democratic self-governance”).
48. Krotoszynski & Carpenter, supra note 28, at 1302–03 (alternation in original).
49. Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 131 S. Ct. 2488, 2498 (2011) (citing Higginson,
supra note 15, at 146).
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petition.50 The private grievances that were redressed by the government
included divorces, property disputes, and individual tax withholdings.51
In sum, petitioning was a widespread practice both before and after the
ratification of the Bill of Rights and was considered central to political life.
Later, controversial laws like the Alien Act (allowing the President to
deport noncitizens who were considered dangerous), the Sedition Act
(criminalizing unlawful assembly and publication of false or malicious
writing against the government), and the Naturalization Act at the turn of
the 19th century brought on floods of petitions.52
Petitioning fell from its exalted position, however, when pro-slavery
representatives in Congress imposed the gag rule on anti-slavery petitioners
in the 1830s.53 During this time, Congress’s infringement on the right was
not challenged in the Supreme Court, and popular petitioning fell largely
into disuse.54
Not so for the politically active, however. Legislative petitioning was a
central strategy utilized by both the women’s suffrage and antiProhibitionist movements.55 Impact litigation, another form of petitioning,
has been successfully utilized for decades—particularly during and since
the civil rights movement—by a wide variety of organizations, from the
Sierra Club to the Center for Reproductive Rights to the NAACP.
Notably, the Supreme Court has explicitly recognized this form of
petitioning as political expression, and importantly, characterized it as the
only avenue by which minority groups may be able to petition the
government.56 And popular petitioning—in the form of mass signature
gathering to support a request for redress—flourished in the twentieth
century.57
C. Purpose of the Right to Petition
Petitioning was considered a formal mechanism by which people
participated in English and American colonial political life.58 It was

50. Wishnie, supra note 14, at 699 (citing 8 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST
FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, at xvi (Kenneth R. Bowling et al.
eds., 1998)).
51. See Higginson, supra note 15, at 146.
52. See Wishnie, supra note 14, at 710–11 (describing this anti-immigrant legislation at
the turn of the nineteenth century).
53. See Krotoszynski & Carpenter, supra note 31, at 1304.
54. See id. at 1305.
55. Tabatha Abu El-Haj, Changing the People: Legal Regulation and American
Democracy, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 33–34 (2011).
56. See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 430 (1963).
57. Abu El-Haj, supra note 55, at 30–34 (documenting the history of petitioning and
noting that the nature of petitioning has changed qualitatively in the twentieth century).
58. Spanbauer, supra note 17, at 20–28 (describing the individual’s right of petition in
England as having matured by the 1700s and stating that “[a]ll colonies . . . recognized
petitioning as a method by which individuals participated in government”); Wishnie, supra
note 14, at 685–86 (describing the centrality of petitioning in England prior to the American
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exercised by noncitizens, disenfranchised white males (prisoners and those
without property), women, free Blacks, Native Americans, and even
slaves.59 The purposes petitioning serve are many, and some of these
purposes overlap with speech. As the Supreme Court recently noted, both
speech and petitioning advance individual self-expression.60 Both are
integral to democracy,
[a]lthough not necessarily in the same way. The right to petition allows
citizens to express their ideas, hopes, and concerns to their government
and their elected representatives, whereas the right to speak fosters the
public exchange of ideas that is integral to deliberative democracy as well
as to the whole realm of ideas and human affairs. . . . [A]lthough the right
to petition is generally concerned with expression directed to the
government seeking redress of a grievance.61

The Court’s final point bears emphasis, more so than the Court gave it.
The right to petition is not merely “generally” concerned with expression
directed to government seeking redress; rather, by definition, the right
involves two requisite elements that the right to speech does not: a
particular audience, and a particular purpose. Speech, as it is protected by
the First Amendment, may or may not be directed to government, and it
may or may not be made for the purpose of redress. While speech and
petitioning overlap, they are not coextensive.62
As I will discuss later, this point is critical when determining how the
courts should analyze Petition Clause claims. The guarantee provided by
the Petition Clause is not concerned with protecting the content of the
communication, as is the guarantee provided by the Speech Clause. “The
right [to petition] does not hinge on whether the citizen is right or wrong,
wise or foolish, well intentioned or mean spirited. That way lies
government censorship.”63 Rather, the Petition Clause guarantees access to
the government, and specifically, access to present a certain kind of
communication—a request for redress— regardless of what is asked for.

Revolution and arguing that “[r]obust petitioning was also a central feature of political life in
the American colonies.”).
59. Wishnie, supra note 14, at 688–89 (“[P]etitioning was a right exercised by all
members of colonial society without regard to a petitioner’s formal membership in ‘a
national community or . . . otherwise [having] developed sufficient connection with this
country.’ Disenfranchised white males, such as prisoners and those without property, as well
as women, free blacks, Native Americans, and even slaves, exercised their right to petition
the government for redress of grievances.” (citations omitted)).
60. See Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 131 S. Ct. 2488, 2494 (2011).
61. Id. at 2495.
62. Justice Scalia made precisely this point in his dissent in Guarnieri: “The Court
correctly holds that the Speech Clause and Petition Clause are not co-extensive.” Id. at 2504
(Scalia, J., dissenting); see also KROTOSZYNSKI, supra note 31, at 155 (arguing that the
Petition Clause, “properly construed and applied, should guarantee would-be petitioners a
right, exclusive of their speech and assembly freedoms, to seek redress of their grievances
within both sight and hearing of those capable of giving redress.”).
63. PRING & CANAN, supra note 12, at 16. As will be discussed below, there is one
qualification based on content: the petition may not be a sham.
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This distinction, when applied to a call to the police for help, is quite
clear. A DV victim’s call to the police for help is a form of communication
that is indeed expressive. But its purpose is not merely expression. Rather,
its purpose is to communicate a specific request, and to make this request to
the only audience that can provide redress.
Compare a DV victim’s call to the police with a DV victim’s personal or
political decision to speak publicly about the violence in her home.
Speaking to other women in grassroots, “consciousness-raising” groups was
a critical step identified by battered women’s activists in the 1960s and
1970s. “By claiming that what happened between men and women in the
privacy of their home was deeply political, the women’s liberation
movement set the stage for the battered women’s movement.”64 The right
to engage in consciousness-raising is protected by the right to free speech.
It embodies the core values of the right to speech: expression for the
purposes of self-realization, truth-seeking, and public debate.65
The right to access the police for help is another matter.66 It is the right
to seek immediate, critical and perhaps life-saving assistance. This form of
expression is protected by the right to petition. That right guarantees that
the doors of government remain open to the governed.
But the Petition Clause serves not merely the governed; it also serves the
governors.67 It is a two-sided coin.68 Petitions provide “an important
stream of information about the views and concerns of the people,
informing government decisions about individual cases and the need for
generalized policymaking.”69 Petitioning is therefore central to selfgovernance:
[C]ommunications to national, state, and local legislators continue to
serve vital purposes. They inform representatives of . . . the operation of
laws and agencies on residents of their districts; prompt inquiries by
legislative office to executive branch agencies that eventually yield
individual redress; and illuminate broader statutory, regulatory, or
budgetary deficiencies.”70

64. SUSAN SCHECHTER, WOMEN AND MALE VIOLENCE,
THE BATTERED WOMEN’S MOVEMENT 31 (1982).

THE VISIONS AND STRUGGLES OF

65. For a recent, short summary of the core values of the right of free speech, see
Bhagwat, supra note 30, at 993–94 (describing three distinct theories of the right to speech
that have gained prominence, including ensuring that the truth shall emerge in the
marketplace of ideas, promoting the self-fulfillment of individuals through expression, and
enablement of self-governance through political debate).
66. This is of course not to say that calling the police, or taking any legal action, cannot
be a political act or expression.
67. See Wishnie, supra note 14, at 726.
68. See PRING & CANAN, supra note 12, at 17 (“The justification for the petition right
lies in the fact that it is a two-sided coin. On the one hand, it protects individuals and groups
who communicate with government; on the other, it also protects government, providing an
‘early warning system’ or ‘safety valve’ against voter dissatisfaction, civil unrest, and
revolt.”).
69. Wishnie, supra note 14, at 726.
70. Id. at 726.
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In the past thirty years, it has been the petitioning of activists on behalf of
battered women that changed the way the government—at national, state
and local levels—responds to DV.71 It was because of the aggressive
lobbying of these activists that the state now views DV as a crime, rather
than a private matter to be dealt with in the home.72 Whereas once the
police responded to DV calls with counseling, mediation, and walking the
perpetrator around the block to “cool off,” they are now statutorily
mandated to arrest abusive husbands and boyfriends for committing the
crime of DV.73
Petitioning activity creates factual sources of information that enable
government bodies to better allocate resources, target enforcement, and
identify gaps in statutory or regulatory coverage.74 This is particularly true
with regard to crime victims’ calls to the police for help. When police do
not have accurate information about the frequency of criminal activity and
the location (or specific jurisdiction) in which criminal activity occurs, they
cannot adequately enforce the law in those areas, for they do not allocate
resources to law enforcement for those purposes.
Resource decisions are policy decisions, and the accurate reporting of
crime from citizens directly influences government public policy. Nowhere
could this be truer than in the context of the police response to DV. Since
the passage of VAWA in 1994, millions upon millions of dollars have been
allocated to the states for the purpose of enforcing criminal laws that
prevent DV.75 The Act provides increased funding to those states that
statutorily mandate (or strongly encourage) the arrest of perpetrators of DV,
as well as increased funding to police agencies that can show improved
rates of arrests of perpetrators of DV.76
With regard to law enforcement generally, courts have explicitly
acknowledged that it “would be difficult indeed for law enforcement
71. For recent, thorough descriptions of the legislative and policy changes lobbied for by
feminist activists over the last thirty years, see LISA A. GOODMAN & DEBORAH EPSTEIN,
LISTENING TO BATTERED WOMEN 71–74 (Am. Psychological Ass’n 2008) and LEIGH
GOODMARK, A TROUBLED MARRIAGE: DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM 16–22
(N.Y. Univ. Press 2012).
72. See Kuennen, supra note 4, at 521–23.
73. See id.
74. See Wishnie, supra note 14, at 727.
75. For a discussion of the federal dollars that have flowed to states for the purpose of
combating DV, particularly in the area of criminal justice and the arrest and prosecution of
perpetrators of DV, see GOODMARK, supra note 71, at 18–22.
76. The Services for Training Officers and Prosecutors Grant, the
single largest pool of money appropriated under VAWA, was designed to
strengthen the law enforcement response to violence against women by enabling
states and localities to hire and train personnel, receive technical assistance, collect
data, and purchase equipment. . . . [T]he grant is specifically intended to “increase
the apprehension, prosecution, and adjudication of persons committing violent
crimes against women.”
GOODMARK, supra note 71, at 19 (quoting GARRINE P. LANEY, CONG. RESEARCH. SERV., RL
30871, VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN ACT: HISTORY AND FEDERAL FUNDING 2 (2010),
available at http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL30871_20100226.pdf.
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authorities to discharge their duties if citizens were in any way discouraged
from providing information”77 and that any “chilling effect” on providing
information to the police would render the police “handicapped in
protecting the public.”78
The Petition Clause assures citizens’ access to their government, and
government’s access to its citizens.79 As one court succinctly summarized,
Citizen access to the institutions of government constitutes one of the
foundations upon which our republican form of government is premised.
In a representative democracy government acts on behalf of the people,
and effective representation depends to a large extent upon the ability of
the people to make their wishes known to governmental officials acting
on their behalf.80

In this way, the right to petition—more so than the right to speech,
protects a value lying at the core of the First Amendment: selfgovernance.81 Petitioning is, according to the Supreme Court: “the source
of other fundamental rights, for petitions have provided a vital means for
citizens to request recognition of new rights and to assert existing rights
against the sovereign.”82
D. Supreme Court Doctrine Blurs the Rights of Petition and Speech
If the right to petition is essential to political life (as its history shows),
and to the effective functioning of government (as its application in the
context of calling the police shows), why is the right the unknown soldier of
the First Amendment guarantees?
One reason is that few litigants have pressed claims under it.83 Another
reason, noted by virtually every scholar who has written about the right, is
that the Supreme Court has not sufficiently distinguished it from the other

77. Forro Precision, Inc. v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 673 F.2d 1045, 1060 (9th Cir.
1982).
78. Ottensmeyer v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. of Md., 756 F.2d 986, 994 (4th Cir.
1985).
79. See KROTOSZYNSKI, supra note 31, at 153 (“For government to address successfully
the wants and desires of We the People, it must listen and engage popular concerns on a
timely basis.”).
80. Protect Our Mountain Env’t, Inc. v. Dist. Court, 677 P.2d 1361, 1364 (Colo. 1984).
81. See KROTOSZYNSKI, supra note 31, at 153 (“The ability to access and engage
government, in a meaningful way, remains central to the success of the project of democratic
self-government.”).
82. Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 131 S. Ct. 2488, 2500 (2011). Similarly, the Court
has characterized the right as “implied by ‘[t]he very idea of a government, republican in
form.’” BE & K Constr. Co. v. NLRB, 536 U.S. 516, 524–25 (2002) (quoting United States
v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 552 (1876)). Some scholars argue that the Petition Clause is the
source of the other First Amendment rights themselves. See Smith, supra note 36, at 1153
(“Petitioning is the likely source of the other expressive rights—speech, press, and
assembly” included in the First Amendment.); see also Krotoszynski & Carpenter, supra
note 28, at 1299 n.269 (describing rights of speech, press, and assembly as progeny of the
right to petition).
83. See Wishnie, supra note 14, at 715.
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First Amendment rights.84 In some cases, it has treated Petition Clause
claims as separate, and analytically distinct, from Speech Clause claims;85
in others, it has treated the right of petition as subsumed within the right of
speech.86
An example of the former is illustrated by the Court’s two foundational
Petition Clause decisions, Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr
Motor Freight, Inc.87 and United Mine Workers of America v.
Pennington,88 both antitrust cases. In these cases the Court permitted
companies to lobby for measures in restraint of trade because, it reasoned,
antitrust laws cannot be read to limit or invade the constitutional right to
petition the government.89 No matter how aggressive or illegal (from an
84. See, e.g., Krotoszynski & Carpenter, supra note 28, at 1305–08; Spanbauer, supra
note 17, at 17–18 (arguing that the Court’s interpretation of the right to petition is that it
deserves no greater constitutional protection than the right to speech); Wishnie, supra note
14, at 713 (describing that the current doctrine treats petitioning as subsumed within speech).
85. For example, in BE & K Construction. Co. v. NLRB, the Court considers and rejects
these analogies to speech doctrine. 536 U.S. at 530–31. First, the idea that false statements
are not immunized by the right to freedom of speech could be transposed onto petitioning
claims to say that baseless litigation is not immunized by the right to petition. The majority
concluded that while this analogy is helpful it does not suggest that the class of baseless
litigation is completely unprotected. Id. at 531. Second, with regard to prior restraints on
speech, the Court stated,
By analogy to other areas of First Amendment law, one might assume that any
concerns related to the right to petition must be greater when enjoining ongoing
litigation than when penalizing completed litigation. After all, the First
Amendment historically provides greater protections from prior restraints than
after-the-fact penalties, and enjoining a lawsuit could be characterized as a prior
restraint, whereas declaring a completed lawsuit unlawful could be characterized
as an after-the-fact penalty on petitioning. But this analogy at most suggests that
injunctions may raise greater First Amendment concerns, not that after-the-fact
penalties raise no concerns.
Id. at 530 (citations omitted).
86. See Guarnieri, 131 S. Ct. 2488. As a point of clarification, when I refer to the
Court’s decisions regarding petitioning, I refer to the following line of cases, most often
discussed in the scholarly literature regarding petitioning: BE & K Constr. Co., 536 U.S.
516; Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403 (2002); Prof’l Real Estate Investors, Inc. v.
Columbia Pictures Indus., 508 U.S. 49 (1993); City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Adver.,
Inc., 499 U.S. 365 (1991); Bill Johnson’s Rests., Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731 (1983);
NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982); Cal. Motor Transp. Co. v.
Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972); United Mine Workers of Am. v. Ill. State Bar
Ass’n, 389 U.S. 217 (1967); United Mine Workers of Am. v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657
(1965); Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel Va. State Bar, 377 U.S. 1 (1964); NAACP
v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); E. R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc.,
365 U.S. 127 (1961). Some scholars argue that “court access” cases might also be included
on this list, though they acknowledge that the Court has not clearly recognized the court
access cases as governed by the Petition Clause. See, e.g., Andrews, A Right of Access, supra
note 15, at 570–71; Spanbauer, supra note 17, at 44.
87. 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
88. 381 U.S. 657 (1965). Noerr and Pennington together are referred to as the NoerrPennington Doctrine.
89. See Noerr, 365 U.S. at 137–38 (“To hold that . . . the people cannot freely inform the
government of their wishes would impute to the Sherman Act a purpose to regulate, not
business activity, but political activity, a purpose which would have no basis whatever in the
legislative history of the Act. Secondly, and of at least equal significance, such a
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antitrust context) the tactics used,90 individuals (and companies) have the
right, as set forth in the Petition Clause, to influence the government, with
only one exception: if the lobbying or other petitioning activity is a mere
“sham” to cover up what is really only an attempt to interfere with or
retaliate against another.91
Based on Noerr and Pennington, and a few cases that followed, it
appeared that for a time the Court recognized petitioning as analytically
distinct from speech and deserving of almost absolute protection, but for the
sham exception.92 There was no balancing of the individual’s interest and
the government’s, as the Court does with the majority of Speech Clause
cases.93 Instead, the Court protected petitioning almost absolutely.94
This was not so in McDonald v. Smith.95 A North Carolina citizen wrote
a letter to President Reagan, voicing his opposition to a particular candidate
for U.S. Attorney.96 When the candidate filed a libel suit, McDonald
argued that he had absolute immunity for the contents of the letter, based on
the protection provided by the Petition Clause.97 The Court unanimously
rejected the argument and held that the Clause does not confer an absolute
immunity for petitioning, but only a qualified right.98 “The right to petition
is cut from the same cloth as the other guarantees”99 of the First
Amendment; thus the Court found no reason to “elevate the Petition Clause
to special First Amendment status.”100

construction of the Sherman Act would raise important constitutional questions. The right of
petition is one of the freedoms protected by the Bill of Rights, and we cannot, of course,
lightly impute to Congress an intent to invade these freedoms.”); see also Pennington, 381
U.S. at 670 (holding that joint efforts by large coal companies accused of conspiring to drive
small mines out of business by attempting to influence public officials do not violate the
antitrust laws, even though they were intended to eliminate competition).
90. See Noerr, 365 U.S. at 144 (noting Third Circuit Chief Judge Biggs’s
characterization of the campaign as a “no-holds-barred fight” (quoting Noerr Motor Freight,
Inc., v. E. R.R. Presidents Conference, 273 F.2d 218 (3d Cir. 1959) (Biggs, C.J.,
dissenting)); PRING & CANAN, supra note 12, at 24 (describing the tactics of the railroaders
in Noerr as “a vicious, deceptive, no-holds-barred lobbying and publicity campaign to block
deregulation of their chief competition, the trucking industry”).
91. See Noerr, 365 U.S. at 144.
92. For a particularly accessible summary of this doctrine, see PRING & CANAN, supra
note 12, at 19–29.
93. Wishnie, supra note 14, at 746 (describing an absolute right to petition as
“incompatible with a preference for balancing tests in modern constitutional jurisprudence”
and “not consistent with . . . the Court’s speech, association, and court access decisions”).
94. See, e.g., PRING & CANAN, supra note 12, at 25 (“At that point, Noerr-Pennington
made the right to petition look absolute, except for the ticking time bomb of the as yet
unapplied ‘sham exception.’”).
95. 472 U.S. 479 (1985).
96. See id. at 480–81.
97. See id. at 481–82.
98. Id. at 484 (“[W]e are not prepared to conclude . . . that the Framers of the First
Amendment understood the right to petition to include an unqualified right to express
damaging falsehoods in exercise of that right.”).
99. Id. at 482.
100. Id. at 485.
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In its most recent decision, Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri,101 the Court
indicated that McDonald should be read more narrowly than it sometimes
has been: “McDonald held only that speech contained within a petition is
subject to the same standards for defamation and libel as speech outside a
petition.”102 Herein lays another illustration of how the rights overlap, but
are not coextensive: all petitions contain speech, but not all speech contains
a petition. As the Court elaborated, “There may arise cases where the
special concerns of the Petition Clause would provide a sound basis for a
distinct analysis; and if that is so, the rules and principles that define the
two rights might differ in emphasis and formulation.”103 I argue below that
a DV victim who calls the police for protection presents such a case.
Charles Guarnieri’s case did not. But note: he was a government
employee, not an ordinary citizen—and a public employee’s speech is
scrutinized differently than an ordinary citizen’s speech.
The
government—acting as employer—has far greater leeway to restrain an
employee’s speech than the government—acting as sovereign—has to
restrain a citizen’s speech.104 For as employer, the government has
“substantial interests” in promoting the effective and efficient provision of
services to the public that must be balanced with the employee’s right to
speech; as sovereign, it does not have such interests.105 Thus the Court
reasoned that a public employee does not have the “right to transform
everyday employment disputes into matters for constitutional litigation in
the federal courts.”106
If the Court was truly concerned that public employees would open the
floodgates of litigation with everyday employment issues in the federal
courts, why not simply adopt the test that Justice Scalia proposed in his
dissent: when a public employee’s petition for redress is to his employer,
such as a wage dispute or denial of a benefit, subject it to the same analysis
as if it was speech?107 That is to say, expect him to prove that his
petitioning was a “matter of public concern,” a requisite element in a public
employee right to speech claim.108 But if the public employee’s petition for
redress is to his sovereign—such as to the local tax board, disputing taxes
owed—subject the petition to a different analysis because it is a different
right.
101. 131 S. Ct. 2488 (2011).
102. Id. at 2495.
103. Id.
104. See id. at 2496–97.
105. This is a bit of an overstatement, for there are circumstances in which the sovereign
does have special regulatory interests, such as when the speech occurs on public property.
These interests will be discussed in greater detail infra, Part II.B.
106. Guarnieri, 131 S. Ct. at 2501.
107. See id. at 2506 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
108. To be clear, I am not advocating such a position in public employment cases. To the
contrary, I am a strong supporter of Helen Norton’s critiques. See Helen Norton,
Constraining Public Employee Speech: Government’s Control of Its Workers’ Speech to
Protect Its Own Expression, 59 DUKE L.J. 1 (2009) (criticizing the vast control by
government of on-the-job expression of its employees).
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Instead, to reach the result it wanted, the majority read into the history of
the Petition Clause a requirement that simply is not there: that a petition
must be about a matter of community wide, public concern, and not about a
private dispute. For this reason, it was defensible, in the majority’s view, to
graft a public concern test into Petition Clause analysis. To its credit, the
Court explicitly limited its holding to the public employee context:
“Outside the public employment context, constitutional protection for
petitions does not necessarily turn on whether those petitions relate to a
matter of public concern.”109 The question left unaddressed: What does
the constitutional analysis of the Petition Clause turn upon?
II. ANALYZING WHAT LEVEL OF SCRUTINY OUGHT TO APPLY TO
A VICTIM’S RIGHT TO PETITION
The Supreme Court’s Petition Clause jurisprudence has produced a range
of responses from scholars. Some argue that the right to petition deserves
absolute protection.110 Others argue that an absolute standard is both
unnecessary and unrealistic, given the Court’s affinity in First Amendment
jurisprudence to balancing tests. These scholars argue that a heightened,
but not absolute, level of judicial scrutiny should apply to government
burdens on petitioning.111
Before analyzing whether a government policy is “unduly” burdensome,
one must establish that the policy burdens the right at all.112 It is to this
task I turn first, in the context of battered mothers’ willingness and ability
to call the police, in light of the police “report-all” practice at issue. Then I
address what level, or “tier,” of judicial scrutiny should apply to the burden.
I join those scholars who argue that strict scrutiny should apply: only a
compelling state interest can justify infringement on the right, and this
interest must be accomplished by the “least restrictive means” available.113
I conclude that, even under a less-than-strict (though still heightened) level
109. Guarnieri, 131 S. Ct. at 2498.
110. See Hugo L. Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U. L. REV. 865, 874 (1960) (“The
phrase ‘Congress shall make no law’ is composed of plain words, easily understood. . . .
[The language is not] anything less than absolute.”); Fais, supra note 21, at 1221–22
(arguing that the term “abridge” in the Petition Clause “is ‘to reduce in scope’ or
‘diminish,’” and thus any diminishment of a victim’s ability to report her victimization to the
police is unconstitutional); see also Smith, supra note 36, at 1183 (“An absolute right of
petition must be preserved to fulfill adequately the purposes and interests of petitioning.”).
111. See, e.g., Wishnie, supra note 14, at 727–28 (discussing a number of judicial tools
that would give petitioning heightened, though not absolute, protection); see also
Krotoszynski & Carpenter, supra note 28, at 1288–89.
112. See BE & K Constr. Co. v. NLRB, 536 U.S. 516, 529 (2002) (arguing that the Court
“must first isolate those burdens” before determining whether it raises First Amendment
concerns).
113. See, e.g., Krotoszynski & Carpenter, supra note 28, at 1297–98 (arguing that the
proper test for a restriction on political protesting should be strict: “By treating regulations
that would remove protestors from the sight or hearing of government officials as
presumptively invalid, the government is robbed of its broad brush; it is forced to justify its
interest in security with more than mere speculation and to carry out that interest with the
means that least restrict petitioning protestors’ right to be seen and heard.”).
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of scrutiny, the reflexive “report-all” policy at issue herein is
unconstitutional.
A. Establishing the Burden
While the level of scrutiny that the Supreme Court might apply to an
ordinary citizen’s petition remains elusive in its jurisprudence, one may
pluck from the doctrine examples of potentially impermissible “burdens.”
These include financial costs, such as the imposition of attorneys’ fees;
administrative costs, such as a requirement to post notices; prohibitions on
future petitioning, such as an injunction against similar suits in the future;
and other chilling effects, such as “the threat of reputational harm.”114
Victims of DV may fear that by calling the police, they will put
themselves in jeopardy of losing their children.115 While social scientists
have yet to conduct a rigorous exploration of how significant of a role this
particular fear plays in battered mothers’ reluctance to report DV to the
police, there is a growing body of empirical data suggesting that it is a
serious deterrent.116 In addition to this data, there is widespread

114. See Wishnie, supra note 14, at 718 (citing BE & K Constr., 536 U.S. at 530); see
also Eckstein, supra note 32, at 1683–84 (arguing that the Noerr-Pennington doctrine
“prevents laws from infringing not only petitioning the courts to resolve grievances but also
acts incidental to petitioning the courts to resolve grievances” such as settlement agreements,
pre-litigation threat letters, and other acts clearly incidental to petitioning).
115. See Nicholson v. Williams, 203 F. Supp. 2d 153, 204 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (quoting
expert witness Dr. Evan Stark, on whose testimony the court relied, who stated, “[W]hen a
mother believes that if she reports domestic violence her children’s well-being will be
endangered because they will be removed from the home and put in foster care, then she is
unlikely to report the violence until it reaches an extreme level where public notice is
unavoidable”); Bonnie E. Rabin, Violence Against Mothers Equals Violence Against
Children: Understanding the Connections, 58 ALB. L. REV. 1109, 1111 (1995) (arguing that
mothers and children understand the negative implications to reporting domestic violence);
Pamela Whitney & Lonna Davis, Child Abuse and Domestic Violence: Can Practice Be
Integrated in a Public Setting?, 4 CHILD MALTREATMENT 158, 163–64 (1999) (arguing
strenuously against incorporating children’s exposure to domestic violence in child abuse
statutes because battered women may be deterred from seeking help for fear of losing their
children); Zandra D’Ambrosio, Note, Advocating for Comprehensive Assessments in
Domestic Violence Cases, 46 FAM. CT. REV. 654, 665 (2008) (arguing that removal of
children based on a parent’s victimization deters reporting of DV); Karlyn Barker, Policy
Turns the Abused into Suspects, WASH. POST, Dec. 26, 2001, at B1 (discussing the potential
backfire women face when they report domestic violence).
116. See, e.g., Ellen R. DeVoe & Erica L. Smith, Don’t Take My Kids: Barriers to
Service Delivery for Battered Mothers and Their Young Children, 3 J. EMOTIONAL ABUSE
277, 280, 286–87 (2003) (battered mothers reported reluctance to call police for fear of
removal of children by child protective services); Ruth E. Fleury et al., “Why Don’t They
Just Call the Cops?”: Reasons for Differential Police Contact Among Women with Abusive
Partners, 13 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 333, 339–40 (1998) (victims reported fear of police
taking the children as a reason for reluctance to call the police); Michelle Fugate et al.,
Barriers to Domestic Violence Help Seeking, 11 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 290, 303–04
(2005) (reasons victims surveyed did not call the police include fear of losing children to
child protective services); Sandra Wachholz & Bauke Miedema, Risk, Fear, Harm:
Immigrant Women’s Perceptions of the ‘Policing Solution’ to Woman Abuse, 34 CRIME,
LAW & SOC. CHANGE 301, 310–11 (2000) (study of immigrant women in Canada showing
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acknowledgment among legal scholars, bolstered by a host of individual
victims’ experiences, that a mother’s report of DV to the police poses a
substantial risk to maintaining custody of her children.117
Police are “mandatory reporters” of child abuse. All states have statutes
requiring that certain enumerated professionals report the suspected abuse
of a child to CPS.118 When these statutes were promulgated in the 1960s,
they required only physicians to make reports, and only in circumstances in
which they suspected the physical abuse of a child.119 Over the years, the
statutes have greatly expanded to include other professionals who work
with children and to include much broader definitions of what constitutes a

police assistance was seen as holding potential to involve various forms of state surveillance
and control over themselves and their families, including the removal of children).
117. See Coker, supra note 7, at 834 (quoting a victim who “would never call” the police
again, given that CPS was notified); see also GOODMARK, supra note 71, at 156 (quoting a
victim: “[I]f I had called the police on him, they would have taken both of us to jail, they
would have taken my children to CPS, and in foster care, and it would’ve turned into a
nightmare”); Deborah Epstein, Effective Intervention in Domestic Violence Cases:
Rethinking the Roles of Prosecutors, Judges, and the Court System, 11 YALE J.L. &
FEMINISM 3, 35 (1999) (“If battered women learn that seeking protection from their abusive
partner increases the risk that their children may be taken away, they will be greatly deterred
from coming forward.”); Leigh Goodmark, Law is the Answer? Do We Know That for Sure?
Questioning the Efficacy of Legal Interventions for Battered Women, 23 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L.
REV. 7, 27 n.115 (2004) (“In one community actively working on these issues, I met a
battered mother whose three-day old child was removed from her care. Her act that
constituted neglect, calling her abusive boyfriend to take her home from the hospital when
no one else was available to help her.”).
118. See ALA. CODE § 26-14-3 (2009); ALASKA STAT. § 47.17.020 (2008); ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 13-3620 (2009); ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-18-402 (2009); CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 11166 (West 2010); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-3-304 (West 2009); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 17a-101a (West 2006); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 903 (2003); D.C. CODE § 41321.02 (LexisNexis 2009); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.201 (West 2010); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-75 (2009); HAW. REV. STAT. § 350-1.1 (2008); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 16-1605 (2009); 325 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/4 (West 2009); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-33-5-1 (LexisNexis 2007); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 232.69 (West 2009); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1522 (2000); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 620.030 (LexisNexis 2009); LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 609 (2004); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 22, § 4011-A (2009); MD. CODE ANN. FAM. LAW § 5-704 (LexisNexis 2009); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ch. 119, § 51A (2009); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.623 (West 2009); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 626.556 (West 2010); MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-21-353 (2009); MO. ANN. STAT.
§ 210.115 (West 2010); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-3-201 (2008); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-713
(2008); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 432B.220 (LexisNexis 2007); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169C:29 (2009); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6-8.10 (West 2009); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-4-3 (West
2006); N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 413 (McKinney 2010); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7B-301 (West
2009); N.D. CENT. CODE § 50-25.1-03 (2009); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.421 (LexisNexis
2009); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10A, § 1-2-101 (West 2009); OR. REV. STAT. § 419B.010
(2009); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6311 (2009); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40-11-3 (2006); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 20-7-510 (1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 26-8A-3 (2009); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-403
(2009); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 261.101 (West 2009); UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A-4a-403 (West
2009); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 4913 (2009); VA. CODE ANN. § 63.2-1509 (2009); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 26.44.030 (West 2010); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 49-6A-2 (LexisNexis 2009);
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 48.981 (West 2009); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-3-205 (2009).
119. See Lois A. Weithorn, Protecting Children from Exposure to Domestic Violence:
The Use and Abuse of Child Maltreatment Statutes, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 57 (2001).
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reportable act.120 Now, not just physical injury, but mental and emotional
injuries are reportable acts.
What constitutes emotional or mental injury has proven difficult to
define. Many states’ statutes are vague, or simply do not define the
terms.121 In addition to vague statutory definitions, many statutes do not
delineate the circumstances that create a duty to report.122 For example,
many require a report when there is a “reasonable suspicion” to believe that
a child is at risk of harm. A “reasonableness” standard confuses
reporters.123 And in all states, failure to report to CPS carries criminal
penalties, while making a good faith report provides immunity.124
Consequently, many reporters err on the side of caution; rather than
ascertain a “reasonable suspicion,” they report when there is any
suspicion.125 Indeed, there is evidence that police report to CPS when
children are present but asleep during the incident,126 and even when
children are away from the home during the incident.127 Most troubling—
and hence the focal point of this Article—is the “report all” policy adopted
in several jurisdictions. In jurisdictions across the country, the police report
every DV call in which a child is present—and in some, every DV call in
which one of the parties has a child, whether the child was present or not—
as a matter of policy.128
120. Id. at 57.
121. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 11165.6.
122. See Steven J. Singley, Failure to Report Suspected Child Abuse: Civil Liability of
Mandated Reporters, 19 J. JUV. L. 236, 243–46 (1998) (arguing that vague reporting statutes
that do not clearly state the conditions under which reporters must report cause overreporting). As one example, California requires police to report when it is objectively
reasonable “to entertain a suspicion” of child abuse or neglect. CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 11166(a)(1).
123. See Singley, supra note 122, at 246.
124. See id.; Brooke Albrandt, Note, Turning in the Client: Mandatory Child Abuse
Reporting Requirements and the Criminal Defense of Battered Women, 81 TEX. L. REV. 655,
658 (2002).
125. See Singley, supra note 122, at 242–43.
126. See DeVoe & Smith, supra note 116, at 286 (statement of victim whose baby was
asleep when the police responded to her call to report domestic violence). Also, “present”
may mean not just asleep, but in another room. See Telephone Interview with Stephanie
Jackson, Sergeant, Supervisor of Family Violence Unit, Tulsa, Okla. Police Dep’t (Nov. 29,
2010) (“If a child is in any way involved or present at the scene, then child services is always
called. Being present at the scene includes if a child was not in the room where the assault
took place.”).
127. For example, when the police took the report of Shawrline Nicholson, named
plaintiff in Nicholson v. Williams, 203 F. Supp. 2d 153 (E.D.N.Y. 2002), discussed infra Part
III.B.3.a, the police contacted the state’s CPS to report the DV, resulting in the removal by
that agency of Shawrline’s two children. See id. at 169. One of the children was at school
when the assault occurred. See id. The other was in another room, in her crib. See id.; see
also Telephone Interview with Bartley, Detective, Jacksonville Police Dep’t (Dec. 30, 2010)
(“In most—to almost all—circumstances, if an officer responds to a domestic violence call
and children are in the home, and also if kids live in the home but are not there at the time,
we do usually route the reports to CPS.”).
128. See supra note 5; see also Coker, supra note 7, at 833 (“Some police departments
have developed policies that require officers to report to child protection services every case
in which a child is present at a domestic violence call.” (citing Telephone Interview with
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Victims of DV, and those who advocate for them, view the intervention
of CPS as a highly negative occurrence. As advocates for victims have
argued, CPS
[t]ypically: blames mothers who are domestic violence victims for their
own victimization; blames these women for any negative ramifications of
their abuse for their children; removes children from their mothers’
custody when doing so is not necessary for the child’s protection; fails to
hold the abuser accountable for his conduct; and fails to provide any
services that contribute to the short- or long-term well-being of the child
or the nonabusive parents.129

Thus even if CPS responses to DV victims begin to change, as DV activists
and policymakers are urging, it will be quite some time before battered
mothers are comfortable accepting the risks associated with calling the
police.130
In conclusion, there is empirical data, and widespread consensus among
DV scholars, advocates in the community who work with DV victims, and
DV victims themselves, that victims who are mothers tend to underreport
DV at least in part due to their fear of being investigated by CPS. A reportall DV policy therefore has a tangible chilling effect.131 The question then
is how to balance the state’s objective of identifying a child who is at-risk
against an adult victim’s First Amendment right to petition.132
Drew Kirkland, Captain, Portland, Or. Police Dep’t (June 6, 2000))). In addition, “Captain
Kirkland explained that officers are required to report the presence of children at any
domestic violence call. The police department’s records division forwards the officer’s
domestic violence reports in which children were present to the state child and family
protection agency.” Id. at 833 n.125.
129. Weithorn, supra note 119, at 29 (reviewing the complaints of DV advocates and
concluding, “There is evidence that many child protective systems have operated in this
manner, as well as for the ineffectiveness of the traditional child protection interventions for
adult domestic violence victims and their children.”).
130. See DeVoe & Smith, supra note 116, at 290 (“Even if actual system responses begin
to change to become more supportive of preserving the mother-child unit, battered women’s
perceptions of negative consequences for reporting domestic violence may remain a
significant barrier to seeking help for themselves or their children.”).
131. See Weithorn, supra note 119, at 29 (“[R]eporting requirements will only have . . . a
chilling effect if reports to child protective services are viewed negatively by battered
mothers. Unfortunately, at present, the history and ‘reputation’ of child protective services
involvement in domestic violence cases is anything but positive.”).
132. One point of clarification must be made before addressing this question. When a
police officer has probable cause to believe that a crime has occurred, such as that a mother
intentionally exposed her child to DV—a crime in a handful of states—she could properly be
arrested and charged. The right to petition is not a defense to criminal conduct. See, e.g.,
Richardson v. N.Y.C. Health and Hosps. Corp., No. 05 Civ. 6278(RJS), 2009 WL 804096, at
*9 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 25, 2009) (finding that when the police have probable cause to arrest a
plaintiff, she cannot recover on the theory that she was arrested in retaliation for engaging in
protected speech; once probable cause is determined, an inquiry into the underlying motive
for the arrest need not be undertaken). That circumstance, however, is not the focus of this
Article. Instead, I examine the circumstance in which the police, as a matter of policy, refer
battered mothers to CPS without any investigation of whether a crime such as exposure to
DV has occurred. Here, the infringement on the right to petition is the reflexive reporting
policy. As implemented, this policy regulates petitioning, not child endangerment.
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B. Analyzing the Burden
For the reasons articulated in Part II.A, the right to petition, as a
separately enumerated right in the text of the First Amendment with a
distinct history and underlying purpose, deserves a separate doctrinal
analysis than the right to free speech. I join those scholars (and Justice
Scalia)133 who argue that there is no principled justification for treating the
rights identically. A direct application of the analytical tests used to protect
speech—such as the public concern test in public employee speech, or the
content-based/content-neutral test, discussed below—is neither practical nor
desirable in Petition Clause analysis.
I do, however, argue that the report-all policy described above should be
subjected to the same rigor of scrutiny—strict—that the Court affords the
most suspect government restrictions on the right of speech. Less-thanstrict scrutiny is indefensible in the context of a battered mother’s call to the
police for the same reason it is indefensible when a government restriction
on speech leaves “no alternative avenue” for an individual to effectively
communicate her message, as discussed below. After demonstrating why
this is so, I apply strict scrutiny to the police practice at issue. I also argue
that even if a less-than-strict standard were applied, the reflexive, report-all
policy as applied to a battered mother violates her right to petition.
1. Rationales for Heightened Scrutiny in Speech Cases
The right to free speech is not absolute.134 The government may infringe
on an individual’s free speech right, though there is a continuum of
protection, or “tiers of scrutiny,”135 that courts apply to test whether the
infringement violates the First Amendment.
The level of judicial scrutiny that applies to a government restriction of
speech requires an examination of how it regulates speech.136 If it restricts
the content of the speech, the law or policy is presumptively invalid137 and
subjected to strict judicial scrutiny.138 If it restricts the means or mode of
133. See Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 131 S. Ct. 2488, 2504–06 (2011) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
134. See Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U.S. 36, 49 (1961).
135. See Ashutosh Bhagwat, The Test That Ate Everything: Intermediate Scrutiny in
First Amendment Jurisprudence, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 783, 784.
136. See Alan K. Chen, Statutory Speech Bubbles, First Amendment Overbreadth, and
Improper Legislative Purpose, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 31, 37 (2003) (“Contemporary
First Amendment doctrine establishes a bifurcated analytical framework that focuses initially
on how a particular law regulates expression.”); see also, e.g., Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S.
474, 481 (1988) (“As Perry makes clear, the appropriate level of scrutiny is initially tied to
whether the statute distinguishes between prohibited and permitted speech on the basis of
content.” (citing Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983)));
Krotoszynski & Carpenter, supra note 28, at 1261 (“The strictness with which the Court
polices this rule is vital to the protection of speech activity because the presence or absence
of content neutrality determines the level of scrutiny to which a speech restriction will be
subjected.”).
137. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992).
138. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 653 (1994).
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speech, leaving available other avenues of communication, it is subject to a
variety of less rigorous, open-ended balancing tests, depending upon the
specific type of restriction and the place where the speech occurs.139 In
these balancing tests, the court weighs the government’s interest in
restricting the speech against the speaker’s interest in expression; the
greater the government interferes with speech, the greater the burden on the
government to justify the interference.140
The same framework may not easily be translated to right-to-petition
claims. Application of the content-based versus content-neutral distinction
to a battered mother’s call to the police is both unworkable on a practical
level and undesirable on a theoretical level. Practically, a policy that on its
face directs the police to report the presence of a child at the scene of
domestic violence, but not other types of violence, such as stranger violence
or community violence, may constitute a subject-matter (content-based)
restriction,141 for it discourages, and sometimes punishes, communication
to the police about an entire subject—domestic violence.142 On the other
hand, the speech contained in the petitions of some victims of DV—those
who are not mothers—is not infringed, for the policy of contacting CPS
does not apply to this group of DV victims. It simply does not make sense,
nor does it advance the analysis, to apply the content-based versus contentneutral distinction.
The content-based, neutral distinction is also undesirable as a theoretical
matter in Petition Clause cases. As discussed in Part I.C, at the heart of
petitioning is access to a particular audience—the government—for the
139. See Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 189, 190 (1983) (“The Supreme Court tests the constitutionality of contentneutral restrictions with an essentially open-ended form of balancing. That is, in each case
the Court considers the extent to which the restriction limits communication, ‘the
substantiality of the government interests’ served by the restriction, and ‘whether those
interests could be served by means that would be less intrusive on activity protected by the
First Amendment.’” (quoting Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 70
(1981))).
140. See Id. at 190 (“The greater the interference with effective communication, the
greater the burden on government to justify the restriction.”).
141. To be subject matter neutral, a government policy cannot restrict communication of
or about an entire subject. “Such restrictions are directed, not at particular ideas, viewpoints,
or items of information, but at entire subjects of expression.” Id. at 239.
142. A central purpose of the content distinction is to prevent government restrictions
against particular viewpoints. Note, The Content Distinction in Free Speech Analysis After
Renton, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1904 (1989). I do not here discuss viewpoint discrimination,
which restricts speech not based on its subject, but on its speaker’s view, because this type of
discrimination does not seem to me to apply to the police policy at issue. That is to say, the
policy does not plausibly appear to favor the particular view of a mother over the particular
view of someone who is not a mother. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of
Va., 515 U.S. 819, 828–29 (1995) (“In the realm of private speech . . . government
regulation may not favor one speaker over another” and “[w]hen the government targets not
subject matter, but particular views taken by speakers on a subject, the violation of the First
Amendment is all the more blatant.”). Attempting even to conceptualize whether a battered
mother’s call to the police might be a viewpoint, at all, highlights the difficulty of a direct
application of a right to speech analytical tools to the right to petition.
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purpose of presenting a particular type of communication—a request for
redress. Beyond a threshold assessment of whether a petition is merely a
“sham,”143 the content of the communication should be analytically
irrelevant.144 The right to petition protects one’s access to the government.
Thus, the proper judicial inquiry should be focused on how greatly the
individual’s access is infringed.
It is the underlying rationale for, rather than direct application of, the
content-based versus neutral distinction that is applicable to petitioning.
Content-neutral restraints on speech generally leave the speaker free to shift
to other modes of expression and do not distort public debate.145 Less than
strict scrutiny is defensible because these kinds of restrictions leave the
speaker ample alternative opportunities for expression. Without these
alternatives, the values that lie at the very core of the right to free speech are
threatened: public debate is skewed, truth-seeking is thwarted, selfrealization through expression is diminished, and the process of selfgovernance is jeopardized.146
When a DV victim calls the police for help, there quite simply is no
alternative avenue for communicating the message. She has nowhere else
to turn. The police have a monopoly—exclusive, complete, and total
control—over the provision of protection from immediate physical harm.147
Applying less-than-strict judicial scrutiny to a government infringement of
the right, in this context, is not justifiable.
Nonetheless, should the Court determine that a less-than-strict level of
judicial scrutiny applies (though still something more than “intermediate”
level scrutiny), it is clear that the Court shows great concern for the
availability of alternative avenues of expression. Indeed, as Geoffrey Stone
first articulated in 1987, the Court applies a much more rigorous standard to
content-neutral restrictions when they leave no alternative avenues for
effective communication.148 Stone compared a half-dozen Supreme Court
cases to make this point, all of which involved analysis of content-neutral
restrictions.149 In three of the cases, the Court upheld the government

143. Wishnie, supra note 14, at 718 (“The threshold . . . for treating a petition as an
unprotected sham is reasonably high.” (citing BE & K Constr. Co. v. NLRB, 536 U.S. at
516, 531–32 (2002))).
144. As discussed in Part I.C, the right to petition is the right to communicate to the
government, regardless of the content of the communication.
145. Stone, supra note 139, at 200.
146. Scholars disagree about core First Amendment values. Regardless of which value
one might prefer, the above comprise a list of the most discussed First Amendment values.
See Bhagwat, supra note 30, at 993–94.
147. See Wishnie, supra note 14, at 731 (“The clearest instance of exclusive government
control may be criminal law: A victim who cannot petition the police has nowhere else to
turn, and thus special protection for petitioning on criminal matters would cohere strongly
with the court access doctrines.”).
148. See Stone, supra note 139, at 190 n.5.
149. Id.
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restrictions;150 in the other three the Court struck them down.151 The
linchpin was whether there were meaningful alternative avenues for
communication.152 More than twenty years later, Ashutosh Bhagwat
reached a similar conclusion about the Court’s treatment of content-neutral
restrictions of speech:
The commonality appears to be that the Court will uphold regulations of
speech so long as, in its view, the regulation keeps open for that speaker
ample alternative, and effective, channels of communication. If, however,
the Court concludes that the regulation effectively forecloses a speaker
from communicating her message, it is struck down.153

The argument that alternative and effective avenues of communication
are as important to Petition Clause analysis as to Speech Clause analysis is
bolstered by the Court’s own reasoning in its most recent Petition Clause
decision, Guarnieri. There the Court observed that the government, when
acting as employer, provided multiple avenues of redress to protect public
employees’ rights, including filing a grievance with the union, filing an
administrative complaint, and filing a lawsuit under a host of state and
federal laws.154 Although the Court treated Guarnieri’s claim as speech,
rather than as a petition, it did so (as discussed above) in the context of the
government’s special regulatory interests in the efficient and effective
operation of government.
In speech cases such as public employment, where the government has a
special regulatory interest—and indeed similarly in public forum cases,
150. U.S. Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass’ns, 453 U.S. 114 (1981);
Heffron v. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640 (1981); United States v.
O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
151. Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981); NAACP v. Button, 371
U.S. 415 (1963); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
152. Indeed, Stone expresses this repeatedly. See Stone, supra note 139 at 190–92 n.5.
153. Bhagwat, supra note 135, at 790. To the list of cases Stone analyzed, Bhagwat
added these in the category of government restrictions the Court upheld, for providing
alternative avenues of communication: Thomas v. Chi. Park Dist., 534 U.S. 316 (2002); Hill
v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000); Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989);
Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988); Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S.
288 (1984). To the category of those struck down, for failing to provide alternative avenues
of communication, Bhagwat added: Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S.
672 (1992), and United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171 (1983). For a similar discussion, see
RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SMOLLA AND NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH 3-71–3-74 (1994)
(describing the Court’s content-neutral restriction analysis as having an “accordion-like”
quality that the Court at times implements rigidly and at other times weakly).
154. The Court explained:
The government can and often does adopt statutory and regulatory mechanisms to
protect the rights of employees against improper retaliation or discipline, while
preserving important government interests. Employees who sue under federal and
state employment laws often benefit from generous and quite detailed
antiretaliation provisions. These statutory protections are subject to legislative
revision and can be designed for the unique needs of State, local, or Federal
Governments, as well as the special circumstances of particular governmental
offices and agencies.
Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 131 S. Ct. 2488, 2497 (2011) (citations omitted).
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where the government has a special proprietary interest—the Court will put
a brake on the rigor with which it scrutinizes the government restriction at
issue, in deference to the government’s special interests.155 However, when
the government has no special interests, such as when the speech occurs in
an ordinary citizen’s home,156 the Court has applied extra stringency both
because of the “long constitutional tradition of respecting ‘individual liberty
in the home’. . . and because of the absence of regulatory needs that exist
when the government is managing its own property.”157
The courts of appeals have indeed applied these Speech Clause principles
to their Petition Clause analyses. In Thaddeus-X v. Blatter,158 the court was
presented with the question of whether the public concern test should apply
to prisoners’ Petition Clause claims.159 The court, like other circuit courts
of appeals, held that it could not be imported into the prison setting.160 In
reaching its conclusion, the court observed that First Amendment claims
must be analyzed in context. It sketched out a continuum of situations:
Standing in a city park (the classic “public forum”) at a rally, a citizen is
free to say almost anything without interference from the government;
any restriction on his speech must be “narrowly tailored to serve a
significant government interest.” Standing in his office at a state agency,
an employee is free to speak up about matters of public concern; his
government employer “enjoy[s] wide latitude” in limiting other speech to
enable the office to function properly and efficiently. Standing in his cell
in a prison, an inmate is quite limited in what he can say; his government

155. See Bhagwat, supra note 135, at 789–90 (arguing that the Court’s decisions in City
of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43 (1994), and Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001), raise
serious doubts about whether the Court intends the relatively deferential Ward test to be a
general test for content-neutral regulations).
156. See City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43 (1994) (the Court struck down an ordinance
on signs posted on private homes, though there was no government proprietary interest at
stake); see also Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001). Bhagwat relied on Bartnicki
when he reached the conclusion that there are “serious doubts about whether the Court
intends the relatively deferential Ward test to be a general test for content-neutral
regulations.” Bhagwat, supra note 135, at 791.
157. Bhagwat, supra note 135, at 790 (quoting the Court’s rationale in Ladue).
158. 175 F.3d 378 (6th Cir. 1999).
159. Id.
160. Id. at 393 (“Given the distinctive rights of the two types of plaintiffs, the separate
interests of the two types of government entities, and the dissimilar nature of the relationship
between the plaintiff and the government in these two settings, any honest attempt to
perform the balancing prescribed by the Supreme Court in Pickering cannot unhesitatingly
import reasoning from the public employment setting into the prison setting.”); see also
Bridges v. Gilbert, 557 F.3d 541, 551 (7th Cir. 2009) (citing the Fifth and Eighth Circuits,
and holding that the public concern test is not applicable in the prison context); Friedl v. City
of New York, 210 F.3d 79, 87 (2d Cir. 2000) (“[W]e reject the contention . . . that where the
[prisoner] alleges retaliation for . . . a petition to the government, he must ‘establish that the
speech contained in his petition . . . was a matter of public concern.’”); Cornell v. Woods, 69
F.3d 1383, 1388 (8th Cir. 1995) (applying Turner without mention of the public concern test
for prisoners’ claims); Jackson v. Cain, 864 F.2d 1235, 1248 (5th Cir. 1989) (applying
Turner’s “legitimate penological interests” test without mention of the public concern test
for prisoners’ claims).
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jailor can impose speech-limiting regulations that are “reasonably related
to legitimate penological interests.”161

Thus there is a continuum of settings within which the First Amendment
protects petitioning. When the setting changes, so too does conduct deemed
protected in the given setting.162 Neither prisoners nor public employees
enjoy the same right of petition as do ordinary citizens. By virtue of their
conviction and incarceration, prisoners’ constitutional rights are limited.
Their right to petition guarantees them access to courts to attack their
sentences and conditions of confinement; it does not, however, guarantee
the ability to file “everything from shareholder derivative actions to slipand-fall claims.”163 Public employees’ right to petition is also distinct from
that of ordinary citizens. A citizen who accepts an offer of employment
from the government “must accept certain limitations on his or her
freedom.”164 The right to petition—when petitioning as employee, and not
as citizen—is limited to matters of public concern, by virtue of “the
consensual nature of the employment relationship and by the unique nature
of the government’s interest.”165 In short, prisoners may be required to
tolerate greater infringement of their right than public employees, who may
be required to tolerate greater infringement of their right than ordinary
citizens.
A DV victim who calls the police for protection from bodily harm is
communicating as a private citizen to her sovereign. The government has
no special regulatory interest. The victim has no—not one—alternative
avenue for expression. She is communicating about a fundamental right—
that of bodily integrity.166 A government infringement on her right to call
the police should be afforded the strictest scrutiny.
2. Application of Strict Scrutiny
Strict scrutiny requires that a restriction on speech is necessary to serve a
compelling interest and that there are no less speech-restrictive
This test establishes a very high burden for the
alternatives.167

161. Thaddeus-X, 175 F.3d at 388–89 (citations omitted).
162. See id.
163. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 355 (1996).
164. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418 (2006).
165. Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 131 S. Ct. 2488, 2494 (2011).
166. I have not heretofore discussed the significance of the fact that a DV victim’s
petition pertains to a fundamental right. Compare a DV victim’s call to the police with a call
to the police to complain of a neighbor’s loud music. The Petition Clause does not discern
what might be described as “high value” petitioning, as might the Court’s interpretation of
the Speech Clause as protecting “high value” speech. See Stone, supra note 139, at 196
(discussing the notion of high value speech, as embodied in free speech jurisprudence). Yet
the court access doctrine does, as discussed infra note 231—and given this doctrine’s close
affiliation, indeed grounding in the right to petition, it seems worth mentioning here.
167. See Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
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government—not a general balancing test, but rather something
approaching absolute protection.168
The protection of children from the risk of physical and emotional injury
is well-established in First Amendment jurisprudence as a compelling state
interest.169 The question is whether the report-all policy is necessary and is
the least petitioning-restrictive means of identifying children at risk.170
This is a factual, common-sense inquiry.171
There are unquestionably less restrictive means for identifying children at
risk. Any investigation whatsoever on the part of the police would be a less
restrictive alternative. Police could, for example, as mandatory reporters of
child abuse, make the inquiry required of them by the mandatory reporting
statute in their state.172 This would entail a “reasonable suspicion” or
“probable cause” inquiry. As discussed previously, the primary criticism of
these statutes is that they are vague, causing many professionals who are
mandated to report to be unnecessarily confused and, in an effort to avoid
liability, to over-report. Even if police, like other professionals, merely
over-reported, rather than reported-all, this would be a less petitioningrestrictive means of identifying children at risk.
But police—unlike other professionals who are required to report—have
particularized expertise, training, and experience in analyzing reasonable
suspicion and probable cause. Of professionals who are required to report
168. See Stone, supra note 139, at 196 (observing that the “Court has invalidated almost
every content-based restriction that it has considered in the past quarter-century” to support
the characterization of judicial review of content-based analysis as a standard that
approaches absolute protection); see also SMOLLA, supra note 153, at 3–69 (characterizing
“least restrictive means” as a standard that is extremely difficult to satisfy); Eugene Volokh,
Freedom of Speech, Permissible Tailoring and Transcending Strict Scrutiny, 144 U. PA. L.
REV. 2417, 2439 n.95 (1996) (finding only one recent case in which the Supreme Court used
a balancing test in evaluating a content based restriction, and describing this as an
aberration).
169. This point is widely accepted, and has been for some time. See Prince v.
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (declining to recognize a religious exemption to a law
prohibiting underage employment). In the specific context of right to speech, particularly in
the strand of cases covering indecent speech, the Court has concluded that the state has a
compelling interest in protecting the physical and psychological well-being of children, see
e.g., Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989), though whether this is
an independent state interest or one in which the state has a secondary interest only to
parents’ ability to do so is unclear. See generally Ashutosh Bhagwat, What if I Want My
Kids to Watch Pornography?: Protecting Children from “Indecent” Speech, 11 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 671 (2003).
170. See Rutan v. Republican Party, 497 U.S. 62, 74 (1990); Sable Commc’ns, 492 U.S.
at 126; Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 538 (1989); Boos v. Berry, 485 U.S. 312, 329
(1988); Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm’r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 586
(1983).
171. For an argument that empirical data, not common sense, should be the government’s
burden in proving “least restrictive means,” see Alan E. Garfield, Protecting Children from
Speech, 57 FLA. L. REV. 565, 611–12 (2005) (arguing that only in the absence, but not
ambiguity of social science data should the Court choose not to rely upon data; otherwise, it
must discern which data is reliable).
172. See supra note 118 and accompanying text (citing the states’ mandatory reporting
statutes).
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their reasonable suspicion that children are at risk of injury, police should
be the most well-equipped to make appropriate referrals. In fact, of all
mandated reporters, police should be making the most discerning—rather
than the most reflexive—reports.
In my inquiries to police departments across the nation, I found two
examples of policies that bridge the gap between the arguably vague
requirements of mandatory reporter statutes and the need for more precise
and effective police reporting practices. In Charleston, South Carolina,
when police respond to DV calls, they maintain significant discretion about
whether to report to CPS.173 Within the ambit of possible referrals, there is
a presumption that, if a child witnessed the violence, a report will be made.
But the inquiry does not end there; these officers are trained to be
discerning. As one detective explained: “There is a difference between a
one year old hearing loud voices or argument and a three year old hearing a
parent threatening to kill the other parent or screams for help.”174 Using
their discretion after investigation, the ultimate goal is for officers to have
“articulable knowledge” about whether a child actually might be in harm’s
way before reporting.175
Another example is Atlanta’s policy. There the responding officer
submits to her supervisor a set of facts that includes the relationship of the
parties; the time, place, and date of the incident; whether children “were
involved or whether the act of family violence was committed in the
presence of children”; the type and extent of the alleged abuse; the
existence of substance abuse; the number and types of weapons involved;
the existence of any prior court orders; the number of complaints involving
persons who have filed previous complaints; the type of police action taken;
and “any other information that may be pertinent.”176 Based on this more
discerning set of facts, the police in Atlanta make an informed, rather than
reflexive, decision with regard to reporting.
3. Application of a Balancing Test
If the report-all practice were analyzed under a less-than-strict level of
scrutiny, how much less scrutiny does it deserve? Given the absence of
clear guidance from the Supreme Court, I return to the less-than-strict line
of speech cases identified by Stone and Bhagwat,177 in which the Court
struck down content-neutral restrictions on speech. Of these cases, NAACP
v. Button178 provides the most valuable precedent for determining the
appropriate standard of judicial review. This is because Button, although in
173. Email from Mike Lyczany, Detective, Charleston Police Dep’t (Dec. 6, 2010) (on
file with author).
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Email from N. Towns, Atlanta Public Affairs/Open Records Officer (Dec. 1, 2010)
(on file with author).
177. See supra notes 138, 153 and accompanying text.
178. 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
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name a right-to-speech case, was in actuality a case about the rights of
association and petition.179
In the 1960s, the NAACP filed a lawsuit challenging a Virginia statute
that prohibited lawyers from soliciting legal business. As a matter of
practice, the NAACP routinely sought out potential plaintiffs for civil rights
litigation.180 The Virginia statute restricted this practice. The Court, in
holding that the statute was unconstitutional, explained that “under the
conditions of modern government, litigation may well be the sole
practicable avenue” to effect political change.181 Only a compelling state
interest could justify limiting such a First Amendment freedom.182 The
mere existence of the law “could well freeze out of existence all such
activity on behalf of the civil rights of Negro citizens.”183 Clearly, this was
a case centered around petitioning.
The Court found that “however valid [the State’s] interest” may be, “that
interest does not justify the prohibition of NAACP’s activities disclosed by
this record.”184 The Court’s holding rested on the government’s failure to
show that the law was tailored narrowly enough to prevent the harms the
State identified. In effect, the Court explained, the law “proscribe[d] any
arrangement by which prospective litigants are advised to seek the
assistance of particular attorneys,” not just the evils (profit and the misuse
of the legal process for oppression) that the government intended to
prevent.185 Important in this discussion was the Court’s explicit reluctance
to presume that the law curtailed “constitutionally protected activity as little
as possible” but rather its rigor in taking into account the numerous
potentially chilling applications of the law.186
The Court concluded: “Broad prophylactic rules in the area of free
expression are suspect. Precision of regulation must be the touchstone in an
area so closely touching our most precious freedoms.”187 The police reportall policy is exactly the type of broad prophylactic rule that the Button court
condemned. There are several reasons the government might offer for the
policy, none of which justify its broad sweep.

179. See Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 131 S. Ct. 2488, 2500 (2011) (“Petitions to the
courts . . . can likewise address matters of great public import. In the context of the civil
rights movement, litigation provided a means for ‘the distinctive contribution of a minority
group to the ideas and beliefs of our society.’” (quoting Button, 371 U.S. at 431)); see also
Bhagwat, supra note 30, at 986 (noting that the Court in Button “struggled to apply a free
speech lens” to a case that “centered on litigation, a form of activity otherwise considered a
form of petitioning”); Spanbauer, supra note 17, at 45 (characterizing Button as a right of
petition case, though criticizing the Court for its conjunctive reading of the First Amendment
expressive guarantees rather than resting its decision exclusively on the Petition Clause).
180. See Button, 371 U.S. at 422.
181. Id. at 430.
182. Id. at 438.
183. Id. at 436.
184. Id. at 439.
185. Id. at 433.
186. Id. at 432.
187. Id. at 438.
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a. Co-occurrence of DV and Child Abuse
There can be no doubt that children exposed to DV are harmed:
“Domestic violence against the mother is a common, and may be the single
most common, context for child abuse or neglect.”188 The government
therefore might argue that it must cast its net widely to capture this
particular group of children who are at heightened risk of abuse.189
While it is now “commonly accepted” that children exposed to DV are
harmed,190 the data supporting this conclusion is wildly divergent. The
most frequently cited statistics are: (1) that the number of children in the
United States who live in homes in which DV occurs and who are
themselves injured or abused ranges from 3.3 to 10 million; and (2) that the
rate of overlap between child victimization and DV is anywhere between
6.5 percent and 82 percent.191
In addition to the extremely broad range in these estimates, the empirical
work underlying this data has been criticized for its methodological
weaknesses.192 The studies upon which these numbers are based rely on
reports from adult victims who are asked either about their child’s exposure
to DV, or about their own exposure to DV as children.193 Both of these
measures are problematic. First, parents tend to underestimate the
frequency with which their children are exposed.194 Second, there are
serious limits on adult memory and the reliability of self-reports of child
victimization, particularly if the victimization happened years in the past.195
188. Evan Stark, The Battered Mother in the Child Protective Service Caseload:
Developing an Appropriate Response, 23 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 107, 109 (2002).
189. See Weithorn, supra note 119, at 22 (“Arguably, one advantage of including children
exposed to domestic violence within the ambit of reporting . . . statutes is the possibility that
the millions of such children who are not known to law enforcement and helping
professionals will be identified, so that the system can begin to assist them.”).
190. See Justine A. Dunlap, Sometimes I Feel Like a Motherless Child: The Error of
Pursuing Battered Mothers for Failure to Protect, 50 LOY. L. REV. 565, 568 (2004) (noting
the common acceptance of this fact in the literature).
191. Jeffrey L. Edleson et al., Assessing Child Exposure to Adult Domestic Violence, 29
CHILD & YOUTH SERVS. REV. 961, 962 (2007) (reviewing the empirical data regarding
children’s exposure to adult DV, and noting that the two most widely cited estimates are 3.3
million and 10 million); see also Stark, supra note 188, at 109 n.10 (explaining the origins of
the 6.5 percent and 82 percent). One need only type the phrase “3.3 million children” into a
Westlaw search to obtain forty-three citations for this number.
192. See, e.g., EVE S. BUZAWA, CARL G. BUZAWA & EVAN STARK, RESPONDING TO
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 397 (4th ed. 2012); Edleson et al., supra note 191, at 963 (“Most of
these are rough estimates of the number of children exposed to domestic violence and each
relies on imprecise definitions, retrospective accounts or indirect measurement to arrive at a
final number.”).
193. See Judy L. Postmus, Domestic Violence and Children’s Well-Being, in 2 VIOLENCE
AGAINST WOMEN IN FAMILIES AND RELATIONSHIPS 1, 2 (Evan Stark & Eve S. Buzawa eds.,
2009).
194. See Evan Stark, The Battered Mother’s Dilemma, in 2 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN
IN FAMILIES AND RELATIONSHIPS, supra note 193, at 95, 111 (“Although an abused woman or
a perpetrator may deny children have witnessed the abuse, children often provide detailed
recollections of the very events they were not supposed to have witnessed.”).
195. See Postmus, supra note 193, at 2.
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In addition, the studies’ definitions of DV vary and are imprecise.196
Finally, few studies detail the actual nature of the exposure; instead, the
question presented is generally dichotomous, failing to capture the cooccurrence of exposure and actual injury to the child; the severity, type, or
frequency of the violence to which the child is exposed; the developmental
age of the child at the time of exposure; the child’s reaction to the exposure;
and the child’s relationship to the violent adult.197 The problems with this
data have caused some scholars to conclude that they are “too discrepant to
settle on a single number that can root a public policy or institutional
response.”198
Putting aside momentarily what have been described as “notorious[]”
methodological flaws with the data,199 it cannot be argued—nor would I
want to argue—that children who are exposed to DV are not harmed.
Children are also harmed when they live in households in which they are
exposed to community (rather than domestic) violence, parental substance
abuse, homelessness, parental mental health illness, and a variety of other
conditions,200 none of which trigger an automatic (i.e., without some
investigation of actual risk) call to CPS.
The question, then, is whether the harms resulting from the co-occurrence
of DV and child abuse are sufficiently widespread and serious to justify a
generic, reflexive, report-all intervention. This is the question that
renowned sociologist Evan Stark answered, as an expert witness in
Nicholson v. Williams,201 about the CPS policy of charging battered women
with neglect and temporarily removing them from their homes when it was
alleged that the children were exposed to DV.202 As Stark explained, the
“critical issue . . . is not whether domestic violence overlaps with child
maltreatment—it clearly does—but whether this link creates an emergent
risk to children and/or justifies an automatic finding of ‘neglect’ against the
victimized mother and/or the selection of placement as a first-line
option.”203 To answer this question, he examined the two most frequently

196. See BUZAWA, BUZAWA & STARK, supra note 192, at 397 (noting that the different
estimates are a reflection of the varying definitions of DV and the resulting harms to
children); see also Postmus, supra note 193, at 2.
197. See Edleson et al., supra note 191, at 963 (“While these estimates give some insight
into the extent to which adult domestic violence and children’s exposure pervade society,
they tell us little about what forms of violence to which children are being exposed, how
often they are exposed to it and how they are involved in violent events.”); Postmus, supra
note 193, at 2–3.
198. BUZAWA, BUZAWA & STARK, supra note 192, at 397.
199. Stark, supra note 188, at 114.
200. See id. at 110–11.
201. 203 F. Supp. 2d 153 (E.D.N.Y. 2002).
202. See Stark, supra note 188, at 109. Stark published his report in 2002, and he
republished and updated many of his findings in 2012, drawing many of the same
conclusions.
203. Id. at 113.
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documented dangers associated with exposure: direct, physical injury, and
indirect injury as a consequence of witnessing DV.204
b. Direct Physical Injury to a Child.
Children may be directly injured as an immediate consequence of an
assault on them, or injured incidentally during an assault on their primary
parent, such as when a mother is holding a child or when the child actively
intervenes to try to stop the violence.205 Stark comprehensively reviewed
the empirical data with regard to the seriousness and prevalence of physical
injury to children who lived in households in which DV occurs.
With regard to the seriousness, he concluded that “[w]hile the seriousness
of injury . . . cannot be determined with certainty, existing evidence
suggests that [this type of injury] is minimal.”206 One way he demonstrated
this was by reviewing a study of state police in Connecticut, where data
showed children were involved in 17.6 percent of cases where at least one
partner was arrested.207 Stark noted that only 3 percent of offenders were
charged with risk of injury to a child, suggesting that relatively few cases
rose to the level that might be considered “abuse.”208 Similarly, Stark
found that in another study in New York, 12.7 percent of cases “involved
medically significant injuries to victims, and an identical percentage of kids
suffered injur[ies] as well,” but only three of seventy-one kids required
outpatient medical treatment (an “only slightly higher” proportion than in
the Connecticut study).209 “[T]he fact that children are not harmed in
somewhere between eighty-seven and ninety-seven percent of the most
serious domestic violence incidents, (i.e. where police or CPS are
involved), underlines the wisdom of a case-specific assessment rather than a
blanket approach that equates domestic violence with child abuse or
neglect.”210
With regard to the prevalence of injuries to children, Stark noted that a
large, multi-city study found that children were involved directly in adult
DV incidents from 9 percent to 27 percent of the time (depending on the
city), and that younger children were disproportionally represented in

204. Stark examined a third alleged danger, that of the intergenerational effect of
witnessing DV between adults when one is a child. He found that while it “is widely
believed that exposure to violence in childhood predisposes children to subsequent
misbehavior or violence as adults,” there was no sound empirical evidence to support this
conclusion. Id. at 117–18. In 2012, Stark reiterated this conclusion. Id. at 408. I do not
therefore address it here.
205. See BUZAWA, BUZAWA & STARK, supra note 192, at 401.
206. Stark, supra note 188, at 115; see also BUZAWA ET AL., supra note 192, at 401.
207. See Stark, supra note 188, at 115.
208. See id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
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households where DV occurred.211 To contextualize the prevalence of
injury to children in homes in which DV occurs, he compared these
children to those in the general population (in New York, where Nicholson
was tried), and to children in foster care (again, in New York).212 He found
that the rate of harm to children that rises to the level of abuse in DV cases
(between 3 percent and 4 percent) is only slightly higher than in the general
population (2.5 percent) and less than the comparable risk factor in foster
care (5 percent).213 In his later work, Stark cites a comprehensive
nationwide survey in which a nationally representative sample of 4,549
children aged seventeen or younger were asked about different types of
violence to which they may have been exposed and/or of which they may
have been direct victims;214 6.2 percent witnessed an assault between their
parents215 and 4.4 percent (of all children surveyed) reported an incident of
physical abuse by an adult family member.216 To consider these findings in
context, note that 46.3 percent reported a physical assault within the past
year, while 10.2 percent reported a victimization-related injury.217
This data, like Stark’s earlier data, demonstrates that childhood exposure
to DV is not a proxy for child abuse, as the police report-all policy appears
to treat it. Rather, a case by case investigation is required. Loose statistics
and “common” perceptions will not do, pursuant to Button.
c. The Harm of Witnessing DV
In his book, Children of Battered Women, renowned psychologist Peter
Jaffe linked witnessing DV to a range of physical, psychological, and
behavioral problems, such as low self-esteem in girls; aggression and
behavioral problems in boys and girls; reduced social competence;
depression, anxiety; and feelings of helplessness and powerlessness.218 In a
more recent work, Jaffe clarified that the development of serious problems
in children depends upon a host of factors, including the resilience of the
particular child, the available support system, the child’s developmental
age, and the nature and extent of violence to which the child is exposed.219

211. See John Fantuzzo et al., Domestic Violence and Children: Prevalence and Risk in
Five Major U.S. Cities, 36 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 116, 119–20
(1997).
212. See Stark, supra note 188, at 115.
213. See id.
214. See David Finkelhor et al., Violence, Abuse, and Crime Exposure in a National
Sample of Children and Youth, 124 PEDIATRICS 1411, 1412 (2009), available at
http://pediatrics.aappublications.org/content/124/5/1411.full.pdf.
215. Id. at 1415.
216. Id. at 1414.
217. See id. at 1411.
218. See PETER JAFFE ET AL., CHILDREN OF BATTERED WOMEN 26–31, 40–41 (1985).
219. See generally C. Crooks et al., Factoring in the Effects of Children’s Exposure to
Domestic Violence in Determining Appropriate Postseparation Parenting Plans, in
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, ABUSE, AND CHILD CUSTODY: LEGAL STRATEGIES AND POLICY ISSUES
22.1–.25 (2010).
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As Stark noted, other studies suggest that the vast majority of kids who
witness DV show no mental health or behavioral effects whatsoever or,
conversely, that over 80 percent retain their overall psychological
integrity.220 And he found that “several carefully designed studies have
shown that children who witness violence are at no greater risk than
children in distressed relationships where no violence occurs.”221
Moreover, the effects of witnessing appear to dissipate over time.222 He
concluded that there is no evidence that serious problems are typical: he
characterized the boldest claims to the contrary as “spurious” because they
combined relatively infrequent acts of violence with widely accepted forms
of punishment.223 The highest rates of behavioral problems uncovered by
these claims were for temper tantrums, reported for 17 percent of exposed
versus 10 percent of non-exposed children,224 whereas “the percentages of
children experiencing the behavioral consequences that might concern
CPS—drinking, drugs or arrests—ranged between .2% to 2.9%”225
Stark concluded,
The point, however, is that the rate of incidence neither justifies an
assumption of imminent risk, nor a generic policy that considers exposure
equivalent to abuse or neglect . . . . [A]lthough the literature abounds
with broad claims to the contrary, the serious effects of witnessing
parental violence that would merit a finding of maltreatment are limited to
an extremely small portion of exposed children.226

Finally, Stark observed, “By generalizing from clinical samples that
exaggerate . . . the populations likely to be harmed, researchers have
unwittingly encouraged courts, state policy makers and CPS agencies to
mistakenly conclude that exposure to domestic violence is virtually
identical to maltreatment and therefore, requires emergent intervention.”227
This is why, pursuant to Button, a police report-all policy must be struck
down. “Precision of regulation”—not “broad prophylactic rules”—is
required.228 There simply is not sufficient evidence to support a blanket,
report-all, without-any-investigation police policy of referring all children
exposed to DV to CPS.
The government may counter that the police, as first-line responders, are
not trained experts in the complex set of factors, discussed above, that more
accurately predict risk to children living with DV. Thus, a better-safe-thansorry policy, which allows CPS, rather than the police, to make this
220. See Stark, supra note 188, at 116 (citing Sullivan et al., How Children’s Adjustment
Is Affected by Their Relationships to Their Mothers’ Abusers, 15 J. INTERPERSONAL
VIOLENCE 587, 596 (2000) (over 80 percent reported a positive self-image)).
221. Stark, supra note 188, at 116.
222. See id. at 116.
223. Id. at 117.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 117.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 113.
228. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963).
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determination is justified. In other words, while the policy may produce
false positives, this is tolerable in situations where children’s lives may be
in danger. That might arguably be the case if investigation by CPS did not
chill mothers’ calls to the police, and if CPS could effectively handle
massive numbers of reports while simultaneously protecting those children
most at risk. In the next section I demonstrate how neither of these
assumptions is true.
d. Children Who Are Abused by Their Caretakers Are the Least Likely
to Report the Abuse; Thus the State Must Cast Its Net Wide
to Bring These Children to the Attention of CPS
This government justification for increased police reporting to CPS rests
on another assumption: that battered mothers will continue to contact the
police to report DV, despite the risks associated with CPS intervention.
Often, the only witnesses of DV are the victims themselves and their
children. If women stop calling the police, the stated goal of the policy—to
increase CPS awareness of the “hidden” victims of DV, children—will be
thwarted.229 As I have already demonstrated, the report-all policy has a
chilling effect on battered mothers’ calls to the police. To the extent that
the government has not anticipated this chilling effect, it cannot justify the
policy.230
There is ample evidence that victims of DV, and the front-line people
who serve them—advocates at shelters, at courthouses, and in the
community—are highly skeptical of CPS intervention. They understand the
negative consequences of reporting DV and, as one scholar noted, “[T]he
word is out.”231 Victims’ advocates widely argue that CPS misunderstands
the dynamics of DV, and that it blames victims for their own victimization
while simultaneously failing to hold the batterer accountable for his violent
conduct.232 Indeed, CPS is notorious for using overly intrusive, coercive
sanctions against victims of DV.233 Among these is the removal of children
from mothers who are physically assaulted by their partners or ex-partners
229. See Weithorn, supra note 119, at 29 (noting that commentators express concern that
expanded reporting requirements will have a chilling effect on victims’ willingness to seek
help from law enforcement and others, and stating that “reporting requirements will only
have such a chilling effect if reports to child protective services are viewed negatively by
battered mothers. Unfortunately, at present, the history and ‘reputation’ of child protective
services involvement in domestic violence cases is anything but positive.”).
230. See id.
231. Rabin, supra note 115, at 1111 (internal quotation marks omitted).
232. See Weithorn, supra note 119, at 29.
233. See Diana English et al., Domestic Violence in One State’s Child Protective
Caseload: A Study of Differential Case Dispositions and Outcomes, 27 CHILD. & YOUTH
SERVS. REV. 1183, 1199 (2005) (describing the “popular mythology about the intrusive
nature of CPS in cases where DV is identified as an issue); Weithorn, supra note 119, at 29
(noting that DV advocates widely criticize CPS for its misunderstanding of DV and
mishandling of cases, concluding that “[t]here is evidence that many child protective systems
have operated in this manner, as well as for the ineffectiveness of the traditional child
protection interventions for adult domestic violence victims and their children”).
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on the grounds that the mothers have failed to protect their children from a
risk of danger. In Nicholson, children were systematically removed from
their mothers’ custody when their mothers, but not the children, were
assaulted by an intimate partner or former intimate partner.
Sweeping reporting statutes result in substantial overreporting to CPS.
Statistics confirm that approximately 65 percent of the reports made to CPS
over the past two decades have been unfounded.234 Nonetheless, CPS must
by law investigate all reports of suspected abuse. The consequence is an
extremely overburdened agency:
Sadly, modern child protective agencies are, to some extent, “driven” by
their mandate to investigate reported cases, with the result that
“investigation often seems to occur for its own sake, without any realistic
hope of meaningful treatment to prevent the recurrence of maltreatment or
to ameliorate its effects, even if the report of suspected maltreatment is
validated.”235

Critics have thus argued that statutes and policies that encourage the
“reporting of any hint of abuse” are unwise in the long run: “When the
emphasis is on promptness and the number of reports made instead of the
quality of reports, the social service system collapses under the weight of
this front-end policy. In the end, children suffer.”236 Returning once again
to Evan Stark’s analysis, an approach such as this, “which tolerates the
inclusion of ‘false positives’ in the population targeted for intervention,
might be benign where the interventions selected [are] without negative
234. See Singley, supra note 122, at 240 n.17 (arguing that child protection agencies are
inundated with unfounded reports of child abuse and neglect, and observing that in 1998, the
year the article was published, the rate of unfounded reports was 69 percent). The most
recent statistics published by the U.S. Department of Health & Human Services
Administration for Children and Families are, for 2009, showing the rate of unsubstantiated
reports as 64.3 percent. See CHILD MALTREATMENT 2009, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS. (2010), available at http://archive.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/pubs/cm09/cm09.pdf. In
2008 the rate of unsubstantiated reports was 64.7 percent. See CHILD MALTREATMENT 2008,
DEP’T
OF
HEALTH
&
HUMAN
SERVS.
(2009),
available
at
U.S.
http://archive.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/pubs/cm08/cm08.pdf. In 2007, 61.3 percent. See
CHILD MALTREATMENT 2007, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. (2008), available at
http://archive.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/pubs/cm07/cm07.pdf. In 2006, 60.4 percent. See
CHILD MALTREATMENT 2006, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. (2007), available at
http://archive.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/pubs/cm06/cm06.pdf. In 2005, 60.3 percent. See
CHILD MALTREATMENT 2005, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. (2006), available at
http://archive.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/pubs/cm05/cm05.pdf. In 2004, 60 percent. See
CHILD MALTREATMENT 2004, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. (2005), available at
http://archive.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/pubs/cm04/cm04.pdf. In 2003, 58 percent. See
CHILD MALTREATMENT 2003, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. (2004), available at
http://archive.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/pubs/cm03/cm2003.pdf. In 2002, 61 percent. See
CHILD MALTREATMENT 2002, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. (2003), available at
http://archive.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/pubs/cm02/cm02.pdf. In 2001, 59.2 percent. See
CHILD MALTREATMENT 2001, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. (2002), available at
http://archive.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/pubs/cm01/cm01.pdf.
235. Weithorn, supra note 119, at 58 n.243 (citing U.S. ADVISORY BD. ON CHILD ABUSE &
NEGLECT, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., NEIGHBORS HELPING NEIGHBORS: A
NEW NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR THE PROTECTION OF CHILDREN 9–10 (1993)).
236. Singley, supra note 122, at 250.

2012]

RECOGNIZING THE RIGHT TO PETITION

877

consequences for the parties involved.”237 Such is not the case, however,
with the reporting of suspected child abuse to CPS.
In sum, none of the justifications for an automatic, report-all policy
should survive the standard of review that the Court imposes on
infringements that, like the statute at issue in Button¸ leave no “practicable
avenue open . . . to petition for redress of grievances.”238
III. LARGER IMPLICATIONS FOR VIEWING A DV VICTIM’S CALL TO
THE POLICE AS EXERCISING HER RIGHT TO PETITION
The conceptualization of a victim’s call to the police as an invocation of
a constitutional right has larger implications for both victims (the governed)
and policymakers and other state actors who respond to DV (the
governors). Feminist legal scholars widely criticize the justice system’s
response for providing a “one-size-fits-all” approach to DV.239 The
Petition Clause provides legal justification, rather than policy grounds
alone, for the argument that government responses to victims must be much
more precise.240
As I have written before,241 the legal system’s responses to DV are
overwhelmingly premised on the notion that the victim can, and should,
separate from her intimate partner.242 This overarching “separation
237. Stark, supra note 188, at 114.
238. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 430 (1963).
239. See, e.g., G. Kristian Miccio, A House Divided: Mandatory Arrest, Domestic
Violence and the Conservatization of the Battered Women’s Movement, 42 HOUS. L. REV.
237, 305 (2005) (describing the predominant, or “[p]rotagonist” ideology underlying the
current criminal justice system approach as emphasizing the need for victims to leave their
relationships as a deeply problematic one-size-fits-all approach); Nancy Ver Steegh & Clare
Dalton, Report From the Wingspread Conference on Domestic Violence and Family Courts,
46 FAM. CT. REV. 454, 456 (2008) (“In many jurisdictions domestic violence cases, identified
principally by evidence of physical violence, are handled on a one-size-fits-all basis.”);
Cheryl Hanna, Because Breaking Up Is Hard To Do, 116 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 92, 94
(2006), http://yalelawjournal.org/images/pdfs/65.pdf (“We should always rethink our
strategies and avoid one-size-fits-all approaches. The criminalization of domestic violence is
still in its infancy, and we have much to learn about what works best and for whom.”).
240. See Button, 371 U.S. at 438 (“Broad prophylactic rules” will not do; rather,
“[p]recision of regulation must be the touchstone in an area so closely touching our most
precious freedoms.”).
241. See Kuennen, supra note 4, at 532–33.
242. See GOODMAN & EPSTEIN, supra note 71, at 5. The authors note:
[P]olice, prosecutors, and judges typically assume that the only acceptable choice
for a survivor is to separate from her partner. However, recent data demonstrate
that staying may be the safer option for some victims. Still, when a woman
expresses a desire to be safe but also to remain in her relationship, system actors
are increasingly likely to substitute their own judgment for hers, encouraging or
even coercing her to leave. The result is that many women avoid shelters and the
criminal justice system altogether, and the potential benefits of these resources are
seriously undermined.
Id.; see also GOODMARK, supra note 71, at 96 (“By enacting and funding separation-based
remedies to the exclusion of other responses, the state has made a normative choice about the
value of relationships that involve abuse. As sociologist Phyllis Baker writes, ‘The overall
goal of the cultural script for battered women is to leave and to stay away from their abuser.’
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approach” as a means of ending DV underlies virtually every law and
policy addressing DV.243 The reality is that many victims choose not to
separate from their partners for a variety of reasons. One is the rational fear
that doing so will put them in greater danger.244 Multiple other barriers to
separation have been well documented, including dependence on the
relationship for money, housing, and immigration status, to name just a
few.245
Thus the notion that a victim can, should, or even desires to separate
from her partner presents a number of challenges. When victims do not
leave—or when they reconcile—with their partners, they are seen as
pathological, incapacitated, weak, not credible, and annoying.246 Their
petitions are routinely met with hostility and frustration by police,
prosecutors, judges, and court personnel.247 Police have blamed victims for

The script for the legal system is the same.” (quoting Phyllis Baker, And I Went Back:
Battered Women’s Negotiation of Choice,” 26 J. CONTEMPORARY ETHNOGRAPHY 58
(1997))).
243. For the most recent and thorough iteration of this argument, see GOODMARK, supra
note 71, at 80–105.
244. See ANGELA BROWNE, WHEN BATTERED WOMEN KILL 61, 144 (1987) (discussing the
high incidence of further abuse and the risk of homicide); Sarah M. Buel, A Lawyer’s
Understanding of Domestic Violence, 62 TEX. B.J. 936, 937–38 (1999) (arguing that one of
the reasons many women stay in violent relationships is their reasonable fear that their
partners will follow through on threats to hurt the women or her children); 3 “Failure to
Protect” Working Grp., Charging Battered Mothers with “Failure to Protect”: Still
Blaming the Victim, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 849, 858–59 (2000) (describing how “during and
after separation the batterer is most likely to stalk, harass and even kill the mother,” and thus
why women should take batterers’ threats seriously in concluding that it is safer in the short
term to stay in the relationship).
245. See generally Buel, supra note 244; Mary Ann Dutton, Understanding Women’s
Responses to Domestic Violence: A Redefinition of Battered Woman Syndrome, 21 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 1191 (1993); Jinseok Kim & Karen A. Gray, Leave or Stay?: Battered Women’s
Decision After Intimate Partner Violence, 23 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 1465 (2008); Vera
E. Mouradian, Women’s Stay-Leave Decisions in Relationships Involving Intimate Partner
Violence (Wellesley Ctrs. for Women, Working Paper No. 415, 2004), available at
http://www.wcwonline.org/Past-years/battered-women-what-goes-into-the-stay-leavedecision.
246. See GOODMARK, supra note 71, at 76–77 n.61 (arguing that battered women who do
not conform to stereotypical ideas about victims, such as that victims should desire to
separate from their partners, are not believed in court and are viewed with skepticism by
police, judges, and jurors); Naomi R. Cahn, Inconsistent Stories, 81 GEO. L.J. 2475, 2488
(1993) (explaining the degree to which DV victims are judged for not leaving and the
problem with this assessment in light of evidence that leaving is dangerous); Laurie S. Kohn,
The Justice System and Domestic Violence: Engaging the State but Divorcing the Victim, 32
N.Y.U. REV. L & SOC. CHANGE 191, 240–41 (2008).
247. See Jane K. Stoever, Freedom From Violence: Using the Stages of Change Model to
Realize the Promise of Civil Protection Orders, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 303, 336 n.158 (2011) (“I
have witnessed clerks confronting petitioners with the affidavits they were attempting to file
and demanding to know: ‘We were here three, seven, and ten years ago. Why didn’t you
file sooner?’”); id. at 337 n.161 (“[R]eporting on the commonality with which judges believe
that if the abuse was severe enough, the abuse survivor would have left, and their explicit
expression of this belief from the bench.”).
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post-reconciliation violence.248 Judges have been reluctant to issue
restraining orders to women who they have previously seen dismiss their
orders so that they may continue their relationships.249 Court clerks have
discouraged victims from filing petitions for restraining orders.250 When a
victim seeks to petition the government for help and is met with roadblocks,
hostility, and anger, these actions violate the spirit of the Petition Clause.
This hostility exists on a continuum. When it moves from a discouraging
remark into the realm of holding the victim accountable for the DV, it may
violate not merely the spirit of the Clause, but the letter of the law. For
example, in some jurisdictions, victims who are protected by restraining
orders and who subsequently have contact with their restrained partners
have been fined,251 held in contempt of court,252 or criminally charged with
aiding and abetting the partner’s violation of the order.253 Prosecutors have
threatened to bring criminal charges against women who do not testify
against their partners,254 threatened to have them jailed,255 and in fact have
had women arrested and jailed.256 One victim who was jailed remarked,
248. As the court noted in City of North Olmstead v. Burlington, 744 N.E.2d 1225, 1229
(Ohio Ct. App. 2000), when the police found a victim of domestic violence together with a
man against whom she had obtained a protection order, the police not only arrested her, but
“attempted to make the victim responsible for the offender’s behavior.”
249. See Epstein, supra note 117, at 39–40 (documenting the openly hostile and
discouraging remarks made by court clerks and judges to victims of domestic violence who
petition the courts for civil protection orders); see also Alafair S. Burke, Domestic Violence
As a Crime of Pattern and Intent: An Alternative Reconceptualization, 75 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 552, 578–79 (2007) (stating that judges are preoccupied with the woman’s psyche,
rather than focusing on the abuser’s actions).
250. See Epstein, supra note 117, at 26.
251. See, e.g., Francis X. Clines, Judge’s Domestic Violence Ruling Creates an Outcry in
Kentucky, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2002, at A14 (noting that a Kentucky judge fined two victims
who contacted their abusers when a protection order was in effect, and said in court, “When
these orders are entered, you don’t just do whatever you damn well please and ignore
them”).
252. The Iowa Supreme Court has twice upheld such contempt charges. See Henley v.
Iowa Dist. Court, 533 N.W.2d 199, 203 (Iowa 1995); Hutchenson vs. Iowa Dist. Court, 480
N.W.2d 260, 264 (Iowa 1992). See generally Marya Kathryn Lucas, An Invitation to
Liability?: Attempts at Holding Victims of Domestic Violence Liable As Accomplices When
They Invite Violations of Their Own Protective Orders, 5 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 763 (2004).
253. See, e.g., Stephanie Simon, Judges Push for Abused to Follow the Law, L.A. TIMES,
Jan. 22, 2002, at A6 (noting that “[i]n Illinois, some judges hold women in contempt for
disavowing their initial complaints of abuse after reconciling with their [abusers],” and, in
North Carolina, “some judges . . . charge[] women a $65 fee if they apply for a protective
order then [later] decide to drop the matter”).
254. See GOODMAN & EPSTEIN, supra note 71, at 76 (describing prosecutors’ regular
practice of issuing subpoenas to victims and forcing them to testify by threat of prosecution);
GOODMARK, supra note 71, at 126–27 (describing similar coercive prosecutorial policies and
documenting the experiences of four women: one of whom was jailed for failing to testify;
two who were threatened with prosecution; and one who reluctantly testified but recanted,
who was not jailed but was asked by the judge during trial: “We’re here trying this case
because you are a liar. Is that correct?”).
255. See GOODMAN & EPSTEIN, supra note 71, at 76.
256. See id. (“As one example, in Albany, New York, a victim refused to testify for the
prosecution because of her extreme fear of her former boyfriend and her previous
experiences with the criminal justice system’s failure to offer her meaningful assistance. At
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“I’m never calling the police again—even if I’m dying, I’m not going to
call them.”257 Finally, prosecutors have threatened women that “their case
would be referred to child protective services and they might lose their
children.”258
When police, judges, and prosecutors act in a manner that deters the
petitioning activity of a victim, and that deterrence can be causally linked to
the victim’s attempt to exercise her right to petition, a victim may assert a
§ 1983 First Amendment retaliation claim.259 One court of appeals has
decided such a case involving a victim of DV. In Meyer v. Board of County
Commissioners,260 the plaintiff had been involved in an intimate
relationship with a man who was close friends with police officers where
she lived.261 This man punched her in the face.262 The victim attempted to
the prosecutor’s request, the judge held the woman in contempt of court and imprisoned her
for an entire week.”); GOODMARK, supra note 71, at 126.
257. GOODMARK, supra note 71, at 126 (citing Michelle Henry, Pregnant Woman “Never
Calling the Police Again,” TORONTO STAR (April 8, 2008), http://www.thestar.com/
printArticle/411222.
258. GOODMAN & EPSTEIN, supra note 71, at 76; see also Epstein, supra note 117, at 34–
35 (cautioning that one unintended risk posed by an integrated domestic violence court is
that more battered mothers may be at risk of criminal liability for DV perpetrated by their
battering partners on, or in front of, children). Using the specific example of Phyllis
Ojokolo, a client represented by Epstein who reported her husband’s abuse of one of their
children to a Washington, D.C., prosecutor, who then filed child abuse charges against the
husband and failure to protect charges against Phyllis, stating that the charges were “a
‘carrot,’ telling Phyllis that if she followed through on her civil protection order case, the
failure to protect charges would be dropped.” Epstein noted,
In communities and cities like Washington D.C., stories like this one spread
rapidly. Several clients have subsequently shared similar stories with me and have
asked whether they can seek protection without risking their relationships with
their children. In light of my experience with Phyllis, it is a difficult question to
answer.
Id. at 36.
259. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) (reading, in relevant part, “Every person who, under color
of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the
District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress”). While a victim may
file a § 1983 claim arguing an infringement on her First Amendment right to petition, I am
aware of the challenges to be overcome in seeking to develop substantive constitutional
rights. Recently, scholars have persuasively argued that the federal courts are in the business
of chipping away at, rather than bolstering or even affirming individuals’ constitutional
rights. While beyond the scope of this Article, I note the following body of scholarship on
this issue: Erwin Chemerinsky, Closing the Courthouse Doors to Civil Rights Litigants, 5 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 537 (2003); Erwin Chemerinsky, Closing the Courthouse Doors:
Transcript of the 2010 Honorable James R. Browning Distinguished Lecture in Law, 71
MONT. L. REV. 285 (2010); Alan K. Chen, Rosy Pictures and Renegade Officials: The Slow
Death of Monroe v. Pape, 78 UMKC L. REV. 889, 910 (2010); John C. Jeffries, Jr., The
Right-Remedy Gap in Constitutional Law, 109 YALE L.J. 87 (1999); Pamela S. Karlan, ShoeHorning, Shell Games, and Enforcing Constitutional Rights in the Twenty-First Century, 78
UMKC L. REV. 875 (2010); Alex Reinert, Procedural Barriers to Civil Rights Litigation and
the Illusory Promise of Equity, 78 UMKC L. REV. 931 (2010).
260. 482 F.3d 1232 (10th Cir. 2007).
261. See id. at 1235.
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report the violence to the police on four occasions, who gave her the runaround.263 Upset, she confronted the ex-boyfriend in person.264 Though
she never threatened him nor acted violently, when the police responded
they arrested her and involuntarily committed her to a psychiatric hospital
for the weekend.265 The Tenth Circuit ruled in favor of the victim.266
The police conduct at issue in Meyer is egregious; involuntarily
committing a victim who tries to report DV presents an extreme and (one
hopes) fringe case. Yet in its ruling in favor of the victim, the court focused
less on the ultimate police act than on the resistance with which the victim
was met when she attempted to file her report.267
The relatively low level, every day, commonly experienced hostility of
state actors to victims of DV has been widely observed in the legal
literature.268 A routinely hostile police officer may do just as much
damage—or more—than the singular though egregious act of the police in
Meyer, if he or she has developed a negative reputation among victims, or
their advocates in the community. So too may a hostile court clerk.269 If a
prima facie case of retaliation is built around what would chill an average
person’s willingness and ability to petition, even discouraging remarks

262. See id.
263. See id.
264. See id.
265. See id. at 1236.
266. See id.
267. See id. at 1243 (“We have held that denying the ability to report physical assaults is
an infringement of protected speech. In this connection, we are persuaded by the
unpublished opinion in Rupp v. Phillips. There we held that reporting a danger of
commission of crimes was protected by the First Amendment. We thus conclude that ‘filing
a criminal complaint with law enforcement officials constitutes an exercise of the First
Amendment right’ to petition the government for redress of grievances. Under these
precedents we agree with plaintiff that her attempt to report an alleged criminal offense was
conduct protected by the First Amendment.”) (citations omitted) (quoting Estate of Morris v.
Dapolito, 297 F. Supp. 2d. 680, 692 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
268. See supra notes 244–56 and accompanying text; see also Martha Minow, Words and
the Door to the Land of Change: Law, Language, and Family Violence, 43 VAND. L. REV.
1665, 1681–82 (1990) (describing the need for observers of DV to blame the victim);
Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Violence of Privacy, 23 CONN. L. REV. 973, 983 (1991)
(“Instead of focusing on the batterer, [the law] focus[es] on the battered woman, scrutinize[s]
her conduct, examine[s] her pathology and blame[s] her for not leaving the relationship, in
order to maintain that denial and refuse to confront the issues of power. Focusing on the
woman, not the man, perpetuates the power of patriarchy.”).
269. By way of explanation, I note here at the mention of court clerks that, though beyond
the scope of this Article, the court access doctrine applies as well. For a discussion of this
doctrine as it relates to the right to petition, see Wishnie, supra note 14, at 730–31 (“[C]ourt
access cases challenging systemic government interference . . . instruct that even government
rules which indirectly burden petitioning, such as filing fees, are suspect when the
petitioning involves a fundamental right and the state exercises exclusive control of the
means of resolution of the dispute . . . . Applying the guidance of the court access cases . . .
an immigrant victim of domestic or other violence who seeks civil and criminal intervention
is petitioning about a fundamental right to bodily integrity, and perhaps against slavery.”).
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could quite predictably—and effectively—have a significant deterrent
effect.270
Because the Petition Clause is designed to assure that “a particular
audience—‘the government’—is forever open to hear a specialized kind of
expression—a [request] for a redress of grievances”271—feminist legal
scholars and policymakers, lawyers for battered women, and lay advocates
in the community should be encouraged by—and think carefully about—
how far the Petition Clause could, and should, extend to protect the rights of
victims of DV, who are among the most likely of crime victims to
underreport to law enforcement.
Perhaps the most encouraging and significant way in which the
underlying purpose of the right to petition, if not the right itself, has found
expression in the context of DV is illustrated by two whistleblower
exceptions for DV victims contained in the Violence Against Women Act.
The first exception protects undocumented immigrant-victims’ reports to
police. It allows the U.S. Attorney General to cancel deportation for
battered spouses and children who report DV, while U-Visas provide
immigration relief to any immigrants, whether victims of DV or stranger
violence, for cooperating with the prosecution of the perpetrator.272
Congressional findings support the conclusion that the VAWA was passed
implicitly, if not explicitly, to protect DV victims’ ability to petition:
Domestic battery problems can become terribly exacerbated in marriages
where one spouse is not a citizen, and the non-citizens [sic] legal status
depends on his or her marriage to the abuser. Current law fosters
domestic violence in such situations by placing full and complete control
of the alien spouse’s ability to gain permanent legal status in the hands of
the citizen or lawful permanent resident spouse . . . . Consequently, a
battered spouse may be deterred from taking action to protect himself or
herself, such as filing for a civil protection order, filing criminal charges,
or calling the police, because of the threat or fear of deportation.273

Similarly, to address the problem that Lapidus and Fais identified,274
landlords’ ability to evict DV victims who call the police to their homes, the
VAWA provided that reports to police of DV “‘shall not be good cause for
270. This is not to say that any act of a police officer or other government official will
create a constitutionally cognizable § 1983 claim. The plaintiff must satisfy all of the
elements of a claim, which vary across circuits but generally include that the plaintiff: (1)
“was engaged in constitutionally protected activity [such as filing a police report]; [(2)] the
defendant’s actions caused the plaintiff to suffer an injury that would chill a person of
ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in that activity; and [(3)] the defendant’s
adverse action was substantially motivated as a response to the plaintiff’s exercise of
constitutionally protected conduct.” See, e.g., Van Deelan v. Johnson, 497 F.3d 1151, 1155–
56 (10th Cir. 2007).
271. See Wishnie, supra note 14, at 725–26.
272. For a recent, concise summary of the law as it pertains to immigrants, see Laura
Carothers Graham, Relief for Battered Immigrants Under the Violence Against Women Act,
10 DEL. L. REV. 263 (2008).
273. H.R. REP. NO. 103-395, at 26 (1993).
274. See supra notes 24–25 and accompanying text.
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terminating the assistance, tenancy, or occupancy rights of the victim of
such violence’” in federally subsidized housing.275 The law also provided
protection for victims who share a household with an abusive partner:
Criminal activity directly relating to domestic violence, dating violence,
or stalking . . . shall not be cause for termination of assistance, tenancy, or
occupancy rights if the tenant or an immediate member of the tenant’s
family is the victim or threatened victim of that domestic violence, dating
violence, or stalking.276

Finally, the VAWA made clear that for public housing agencies to receive
funding, their policies cannot “‘prohibit or limit a resident’s right to
summon police or other emergency assistance in response to domestic
violence.’”277
The VAWA does not provide such whistleblower protections for battered
mothers who are reported to CPS. A whistleblower protection would, of
course, cohere strongly with the spirit of the Petition Clause. Could the
addition of “battered mothers” within the classes of DV victims whose calls
to the police are protected be a viable solution to the battered mother’s
dilemma? Could not state actors—judges, police, clerks, to name but a
few—who intentionally discourage and resist victims’ efforts to seek
redress be held accountable? Filtering the barriers to reporting DV through
a Petition Clause lens has tremendous, and as of yet, untapped legal
potential.278
More broadly, viewing a DV victim’s call to the police as the exercise of
a constitutional, political right has inherent appeal. It is consistent with the
way that activists in the battered women’s movement of the 1960s and
1970s viewed it. They argued that DV hindered women’s ability “to move
freely and confidently in the world,”279 to participate in the political
process, and to fully develop as citizens.280 These concerns lie at the heart
of the right to petition.

275. See Fais, supra note 21, at 1206 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(c)(9)(B) (2000 & Supp.
V 2005)).
276. 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(c)(9)(C)(i) (2006).
277. Violence Against Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act (VAWA)
of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-162, tit. VI, § 601, 119 Stat. 2960, 3036 (2006).
278. Attorneys for DV victims—particularly attorneys who devote their careers to
thinking about how the legal system might better respond to the needs of DV victims—who
want to develop the Petition Clause as a source of substantive constitutional rights should
think broadly about the many factual and procedural contexts in which the right could be
asserted. See Nancy Leong, Making Rights, 92 B.U. L. REV. 405, 481 (2012) (arguing that
rights made in multiple contexts are more balanced and more comprehensive, and we must
thus “act intentionally to ensure that rights-making occurs in contexts likely to assure that
judges take account of all the interests those rights serve to vindicate and protect”).
279. SCHECHTER, supra note 64, at 317 (describing the history of the battered women’s
movement).
280. See ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN & FEMINIST LAWMAKING 21–22
(2000).
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The early movement was committed to women’s self-determination and
democratic participation.281 Much of this has changed. For a variety of
reasons, battered women’s organizations and advocates act more as service
providers to victims, less as political activists.282 The resounding call by
feminist legal scholars today is for the movement to return to its political
roots.283 Conceptualizing the reporting of DV to the state as a fundamental,
political right guaranteed by the First Amendment is one step in that
direction.
A note of caution: Victims themselves may not view their reports to the
police as political acts. Characterizing the justice system’s response to DV
as political, and hence a matter of public concern, has had many unintended
consequences, including diminishing a victim’s ability to privately order
her life. “Privacy is something that most people appear to want in
relationships. Accordingly, it may be unfair and counterproductive to
expect battered women simply to relinquish their privacy in the name of
politics.”284 Battered mothers should not be forced to call the police in the
name of feminist activism; rather, battered mothers should be able to
petition the government for redress, if they so choose, in the same way that
mothers who are victims of stranger violence may do and in the same way
that any ordinary citizen may do.
CONCLUSION
In this Article, I examined the state’s response to DV through a novel
legal lens, the Petition Clause of the First Amendment, to demonstrate how
a victim’s call to the police to report violence in her home is an exercise of
a fundamental, constitutional right. When the state—through a law,
practice, or policy—deters a citizen from exercising her right to petition, the
policy should be analyzed with the strictest of scrutiny. This is particularly
true of DV victims’ petitions to the police, given that protection from bodily
harm is one of the most fundamental services that the government can
provide, and that the police have exclusive control over its provision.
More broadly, viewing DV victims’ requests to the state for assistance—
whether made to the criminal or civil justice system—as First Amendment
petitions shines constitutional light on the continuum of deterrents with
which victims are met by the system and actors within it. As of yet,
281. See id.
282. See id. at 22–23.
283. See, e.g., GOODMAN & EPSTEIN, supra note 71, at 94 (“[T]he battered women’s
movement must revisit its roots; it must refocus on supporting and empowering women and
incorporating individual responsiveness into government and community programs.”);
SCHNEIDER, supra note 280, at 28 (“[T]he rallying cry for many feminists who continue to do
trailblazing work on battering in the United States has been, as women’s international human
rights scholar Rhonda Copelon has put it, to ‘bring Beijing home,’ to reshape domestic
violence work in this country with the explicitly feminist political and expansive social
vision that first inspired the issue’s advocates.”); Miccio, supra note 239, at 247–56.
284. Kathryn K. Baker, Dialectics and Domestic Abuse, 110 YALE L.J. 1459, 1460
(2001).
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scholars, policymakers, and advocates for victims have not sufficiently
tapped the potential of the Petition Clause to expose and address
government practices that chill victims’ petitions.

